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SAY HELLO AND WAVE GOODBYE: THE
LEGITIMACY OF PLAIN VIEW SEIZURES AT THE

THRESHOLD OF THE HOME
Evan B. Citron*
INTRODUCTION

It was after midnight on a November evening when Patrick McKinnon
decided to ignore his date's request that he take her home. 1 After a night of
drinking and dancing, McKinnon brought his date, D.V., back to his house,
where he pulled her into his bedroom and struggled to begin removing her
clothes. 2 Although D.V. begged McKinnon to take her home, he quickly
two bandanas to
handcuffed and tied her to his bed.3 McKinnon used
4
blindfold and gag D.V. before he began disrobing her.
When McKinnon released D.V. approximately five hours later, she
promptly notified the police of what had occurred. 5 Without obtaining a
warrant, several officers went directly to McKinnon's house, knocked on
his door, and identified themselves. 6 McKinnon opened the door and stood
in his doorway as the officers informed him that he was under arrest for
7
rape.
In arresting McKinnon, the officers unwittingly added another chapter to
an ongoing debate involving the safety of the public, the sanctity of the
home, and a clash between doctrinal approaches to Fourth Amendment
analysis. There is a "great dispute among the federal courts" as to whether
a person who opens his door in response to a police officer's knock
surrenders his privacy interest such that an officer may seize that person in
"plain view" without a warrant. 8 Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have
J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Daniel Richman for his valuable insight and guidance throughout the note-writing process.
1. McKinnon v. State, 752 P.2d 833, 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub nom.,
McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. McKinnon, 103 F.3d at 935.
7. Id. Defendant Patrick McKinnon was ultimately charged with first-degree rape,
forcible sodomy, and rape by instrumentation. McKinnon, 752 P.2d at 833.
8. See Breitbard v. Mitchell, 390 F. Supp. 2d 237, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). It is important
to note at the outset that the language used by courts in dealing with this issue can be
somewhat confusing. Courts often characterize the issue in dispute as whether an officer can
seize an "item" in "plain view" without a warrant. See, e.g., Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d
*
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found such seizures to be constitutional where a person has opened his door
at an officer's beckoning, and the officer has announced the seizure before
physically entering the person's dwelling. 9 This view is referred to as the
"voluntary exposure" view. 10 Other circuit courts, following the "sanctity"
view, have found that such seizures violate the Fourth Amendment and
imperil the heightened constitutional protection provided for individuals
within their homes.' 1 Each view's treatment of the issue is grounded in
established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 12
The voluntary exposure view recognizes the Court's decisions in Katz v.
United States13 and United States v. Santana 14 as the controlling

precedent. 15 In Katz, the Court established that the "touchstone" of Fourth
Amendment analysis is an inquiry into whether a person has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."' 16 If a police
inspection does not infringe upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, the
747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004). The term "seizure" encompasses both seizures of persons (i.e.,
arrests) and seizures of property. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Similarly,
the term "item" refers to persons as well as to pieces of property. See, e.g., Hadley, 368 F.3d
at 750. Although in theory cases dealing with this issue could involve the seizure of
incriminating property "items" like a cache of weapons or supply of narcotics, in practice
that is not so. Rather, the relevant cases exclusively involve the seizure, or arrest, of persons
in "plain view." Thus, the competing approaches to the issue have technically only spoken
to the seizure of persons (as opposed to the seizure of property "items"). One can speculate,
however, that the respective positions of the different approaches extend to encompass the
seizure of property "items." In discussing the legal principles that bear on the issue, courts
tend to use "seizure" and "arrest" interchangeably, as does this Note. The word "item" as
used in this Note should be taken to refer both to persons and pieces of property.
9. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. The "sanctity" view cites the U.S. Supreme Court's consistent protection of the
sanctity of the home to substantiate its approach. See infraPart II.B. 1.
12. Thus, each circuit is arguably adhering to stare decisis in reaching its respective
decisions. The Court has long recognized that stare decisis is a "cornerstone" of the legal
system. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989). Adhering to
stare decisis "'is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."' State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)); see
also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (noting that the bases
for stare decisis include the aspiration that "the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of
individuals, ... the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating
the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case[,] and the necessity of
maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments").
But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (confirming that although "[t]he
doctrine of staredecisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and
to the stability of the law... [i]t is not ...an inexorable command"); see also Payne, 501
U.S. at 828 (noting that "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision'
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
15. See infra Part II.A. l.a.
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
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inspection is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 17
In Santana, the Court established that the threshold of a dwelling is a public
place and that an individual on the threshold has no legitimate expectation
of privacy. 18 Thus, when a person opens the door to his dwelling, he
knowingly exposes himself and a section of his home in a public place and
retains no expectation of privacy. 19 Consequently, he forfeits Fourth
Amendment protection
and a police officer is permitted to conduct a plain
20
view seizure.
In contrast, the sanctity view identifies Payton v. New York 21 and its
companion case, Riddick v. New York, 22 as the governing precedent. 23 In
Payton/Riddick, the Court emphasized the heightened protection the
Constitution provides for individuals within their homes. 24
The
Payton/Riddick opinion communicated that the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a clear line at the entrance of a house. 2 5 The Court specifically
referred to the doorway, noting that "[a]bsent exigent circumstances, that
''26
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
Accordingly, a plain view seizure at the doorway is a Fourth Amendment
27
violation and inconsistent with the spirit of the Payton/Riddickdecision.
The principles that shape these competing approaches are generally
capable of coexisting peacefully. In addition, the respective facts of cases
involving plain view threshold seizures are apt to vary greatly, making it
possible to identify bases on which to distinguish and reconcile different
decisions. There is a fundamental difference, however, in the way the
different approaches evaluate this issue. As the controversy involves
critical questions about residential privacy, which goes to the very "core" of
the Fourth Amendment, 2 8 it is imperative that the Court establishes clarity
29
in the doctrine.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
See Santana,427 U.S. at 42; see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 590. Although the Court's decision is universally referred to as Payton, the

facts of Riddick more clearly illustrate the potential for the Court's opinion to be seen as at
odds with the Katz and Santana decisions. Thus, this Note will refer to the opinion as the
"Payton/Riddick" decision. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
24. See United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537
(1982).

25. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
26. Id.
27. See Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004).

28. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999).
29. Furthermore, under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained pursuant to an
invalid seizure cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the defendant. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The central purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter unlawful police conduct and effectuate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. The rule is applicable in federal and state
prosecutions. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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This Note examines whether the plain view doctrine should permit police
to seize anything they see through an open doorway where the door has
been opened in response to an officer's knock and the officer has
announced the seizure before physically entering the dwelling. Part I
describes the basis in Supreme Court precedent for the disparate treatment
of the issue.
Part II analyzes the conflict between the voluntary exposure view and the
sanctity view in determining whether the police may lawfully conduct a
plain view seizure at the threshold. Part II.A explores the legal reasoning
underlying the voluntary exposure view, and describes the means by which
its supporters criticize the sanctity view as a flawed approach. Part II.B
discusses the legal bases for the sanctity view and outlines the manner in
which its proponents identify the voluntary exposure view as defective.
Part III explains why public policy interests demand that, when the door
swings open in response to an officer's knock, the law precludes police
from seizing an item in "plain view."
I. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE AND THE BALANCE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
AFFORDED TO INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE HOME

This part explores the basis in Supreme Court precedent for the
conflicting interpretations of whether a person who opens his door in
response to a police officer's knock surrenders his privacy interest such to
permit a plain view seizure at the threshold. Part L.A details the Court's
method of defining the extent of Fourth Amendment protection by an
inquiry into a person's reasonable expectations of privacy. Part I.B
discusses the heightened constitutional protection provided for individuals
within the home.
A. Defining the Extent of FourthAmendment Protectionas a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
This section traces the Court's practice of defining Fourth Amendment
protection through an inquiry into an individual's reasonable expectations
of privacy. Part I.A. 1 reviews the warrant requirement and the development
of the plain view doctrine. Part I.A.2 describes the subjective-objective
test, which governs the Court's determination of one's reasonable
expectations of privacy.
Part I.A.3 discusses a person's reasonable
expectations of privacy when standing on the threshold of his dwelling.
1. The Development of the Plain View Doctrine
This section addresses the evolution of the plain view doctrine. Part
I.A. L.a examines the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Part
I.A. 1.b explores the origin of the plain view warrant exception.
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a. The WarrantRequirement
31
The Fourth Amendment 30 prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
32
33
and requires that probable cause support the issuance of a warrant. The

30. The Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The basic purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental intrusions. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (noting that "[t]he overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion" by the government). The Amendment thus relates to the personal security of the
citizen. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property are to be liberally construed. Id. at 635. "It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property .... " Id. at 630. "'[I]t is the duty of the courts to be watchful...
against any stealthy encroachments [on the Fourth Amendment].' Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635); see also Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (noting that the Fourth Amendment should receive a liberal
construction to prevent a stealthy encroachment on or a "gradual depreciation" of the rights
that the Amendment secures). The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are "to be
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty," and are indispensable to the "full
enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty and private property." Id. The Amendment
safeguards "not only privacy.., but 'conscience and human dignity' as well. Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)). Fourth Amendment protection applies only to governmental
action. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). In Burdeau, the Court found that
the Amendment was not violated where a private corporation seized private papers from the
possession of a director and an employee. Id.
31. A search occurs when the government infringes upon an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (noting that a "search" is
a governmental infringement upon individual privacy). Seizure of a person occurs when a
government agent employs physical force or a show of authority to restrain a citizen's liberty
in some way. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Not all intercourse between a
police officer and a citizen constitutes seizure of a person. Id. Seizure of property occurs
when the government meaningfully interferes with an individual's possessory interest in that
property. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. The Court has distinguished a "search" from a
"seizure" by noting that a "search" compromises individual interest in privacy, whereas a
"seizure" deprives an individual of dominion over his or her person or property. Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
32. Probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant exists when government agents have
knowledge of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to compel a
prudent man to believe that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. See
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949) (noting that "'[t]he substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt"' (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881))); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) ("'If the facts and circumstances before the
officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has
been committed, it is sufficient."' (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878))).
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warrant requirement was designed to serve specific constitutional
protections, 34 and does not unnecessarily burden law enforcement
officers. 35 The Court has confirmed that a warrantless search or seizure
36
violates the Fourth Amendment unless a recognized exception applies.
Probable cause to obtain a search warrant exists when a judge or magistrate finds a "fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Searches and seizures "conducted without
warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal quotation omitted). In
Gates, the Court found probable cause where an anonymous letter indicated that defendants
were violating state drug laws and predicted future violations, and major portions of the
predictions were corroborated by federal agents. Gates, 462 U.S. at 242-43. The Court
abandoned the two-pronged test that it had formulated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), for determining whether an
informant's tip established probable cause, in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances test.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Under the two-pronged test, probable cause was established once (1)
the informant's basis of information was revealed, and (2) sufficient facts were found to
establish the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report. Id. at 22829. The Court concluded that the test was inflexible and needed to be replaced with a more
practical totality-of-the-circumstances test. Id. at 238. The totality-of-the-circumstances test
requires a judge or magistrate to make a "practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him," probable cause is present. Id.
33. "The Fourth Amendment was intended partly to protect against the abuses of the
general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs of assistance used in the
Colonies." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); see also Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (noting that "[i]t is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment");
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (noting that the Amendment was "in large
part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence"); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was a response to "the evils of the
use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies"). See
generally Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy': An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1081-86 (1987) (describing the
historical origins of the Fourth Amendment). The Fourth Amendment was "a safeguard
against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes
of the Revolution." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). "Since before the creation of [the United States] government, [unreasonable]
searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty." Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
34. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). The requirement "also
may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and
investigation." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); see also Steagald, 451 U.S.
at 215 (asserting that "'[t]he [Fourth] Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to
redress, unlawful police action' (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766 n.12 (1969))). The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is effectuated by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (noting
that Rule 41 implements the Fourth Amendment by requiring that an impartial judge or
magistrate determine if the issuance of a warrant is justified).
35. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
36. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text. A violation of the Amendment is "fully accomplished" at the time of an
unreasonable governmental intrusion. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
Thus, the Amendment prohibits all searches and seizures, regardless of whether or not any
evidence obtained is sought to be used in a criminal trial. United States v. Verdugo-
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The warrant requirement safeguards two well-defined constitutional
protections. 37 The first protection requires a judge or magistrate to issue a
warrant, thus eliminating searches and seizures that are not based on
probable cause. 3 8 This protection is rooted in the premise that any type of
intrusion in terms of a search or a seizure is an evil. 39 "The security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is "the core of the
Fourth Amendment[,]... '40
basic to a free society," and "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."
The warrant requirement provides a second protection: Necessary
searches should be as limited as possible. 4 1 The greater evil implicated by

Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). The protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures is not limited to tangible items but can extend to oral statements as well. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966). The Court has repeatedly "emphasized that the
mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes." Jeffers, 342
U.S. at 51.
37. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
38. Id.; see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (noting that the
role of a judge or magistrate "was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to
invade... privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals"); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (asserting that
"the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . are to be preferred over the
hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests"). In McDonald, the
Court found a warrantless seizure of adding machines, number slips, and money to be
unreasonable where officers had been conducting surveillance of the defendant and then
entered the defendant's rented room after observing him engaging in the numbers operation.
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458-59. The Court used strong language in discussing the need for a
judge or magistrate to be involved in the search and seizure process. See id. at 456 ("Power
is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted...
[Sbo the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they
violate the privacy of the home.").
39. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. ("[N]o intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior
determination of necessity."). "'The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth
Amendment."' United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (quoting Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964)).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.
Johnson,333 U.S. at 13-14.
40. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967) (recognizing that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental intrusions);
see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (noting that "[tihe overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion" by the government).
41. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. An additional purpose of the warrant requirement is to
"prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure."
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976); see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
96 (1964) (noting that a warrantless arrest "bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure on
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this maxim is a general, exploratory search through one's belongings. 42
43
Such searches "have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights."
The warrant requirement guards against overbroad searches by requiring a
"particular description of the things to be seized." 44
The warrant requirement "does not place an unduly oppressive weight on
law enforcement officers." 45 The Fourth Amendment does not demand that
officers "delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others."'4 6 Nor does the Amendment
prevent officers from conducting otherwise permissible searches in order to
an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by
the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment").
42. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 ("[T]he specific evil is the 'general warrant' abhorred by
the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory
rummaging in a person's belongings.").
43. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927); see also Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (confirming that general search warrants are prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950) (noting that
general, exploratory searches "cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant").
44. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. The particularity requirement limits the authorization to
search the specific areas and things for which there is a probable cause to search. Maryland
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). Thus, the requirement "ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Id. (noting that the "manifest
purpose" of the particularity requirement was to "prevent general searches"); see Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (acknowledging that the particularity requirement makes
general, exploratory searches impossible, prevents the seizure of anything not specified in
the warrant, and ensures that "'nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant' (quoting Marron, 275 U.S. at 196)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
923 (1984) (noting that "a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid"). The particularity requirement also '"assures the
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search."' Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 561 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). The Court has
recognized that "'[t]he uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is
unconstitutional."' Id. at 565 (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5
(1984)).
The Fourth Amendment requires particularity in the warrant itself, not in
supporting documents. Id.at 557 ("'The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant
particularly describe the things to be seized, not the papers presented to the judicial officer
...asked to issue the warrant."' (quoting United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1033
(7th Cir. 1999))). The Fourth Amendment does not demand that the government be factually
correct in its projection of what a search will produce. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
184 (1990).
45. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Rather, it "merely interposes an
orderly procedure under the aegis of judicial impartiality that is necessary to attain the
beneficent purposes intended." Id The prevention of unreasonable searches is "'more likely
to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of
petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused
of crime."' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 n.3 (1948) (quoting United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)). But see, e.g., Robert A. Hull, Note, "What Hath
Hiibel Wrought? ": The Constitutionality of Compelled Self-Identification, 33 Pepp. L. Rev.
185, 207 (2005) (noting that liberties guarded by the Fourth Amendment can impede
effective law enforcement).
46. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); see infra note 53.
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obtain evidence to aid in apprehending and convicting criminals. 4 7 The
prospect that law enforcement may operate more efficiently without the
48
warrant requirement is never a sufficient reason to bypass it.
The Court has declared that searches and seizures conducted outside of
the judicial process 49 are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
'50
subject to "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
'5 1 Consent, 5 2
These exceptions have been "jealously and carefully drawn."
exigent circumstances 53 and seizures of items in plain view 54 each
constitute valid exceptions to the warrant requirement.

47. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306.
48. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("[T]he mere fact that law
enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment."); see also Berger, 388 U.S. at 62 (noting that the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be forgiven in the name of law enforcement). In Mincey, the Court
noted that although crime investigation would be simpler without a warrant requirement,
"the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the
privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of
maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. The
subjective intent of an officer (e.g., whether he was motivated by a law enforcement
purpose) is "irrelevant" in determining whether an officer's conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000).
49. A search conducted without prior approval of a judge or magistrate (a warrantless
search) is outside judicial process. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55. Unreasonable searches
"are denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every State in the Union." Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Court has noted that "[tihe
Fourth Amendment demonstrates a 'strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant."' Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).
51. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
52. "It is ... well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citation omitted); see Groh
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559-60 (2004) (noting that consent constitutes a valid exception to
the warrant requirement). Consent must be voluntary in order to be valid. See Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 228 (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that consent not be "coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force"). Voluntariness is determined
from the totality of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 226. One's knowledge of the right
to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to finding voluntary consent, but is a factor to be
considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Id. at 234.
53. Exigent circumstances connote the type of "'emergency'
or "'dangerous
situation ...that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either
arrest or search."' Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)). Such circumstances usually involve the risk of destruction
of evidence or the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Id. at 749-50. The Court first used the term
"hot pursuit" in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948), noting that such a case
usually involves some element of chase. A "hot pursuit" chase, however, "need not be an
extended hue and cry 'in and about [the] public streets."' United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
38, 42-43 (1976) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
54. See infra Part I.A. .b.
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b. The Plain View WarrantException
The Court has recognized that, under certain circumstances, police may
seize items in plain view without a warrant. 55 A plain view seizure is not a
valid exception to the warrant requirement unless certain conditions are
satisfied. 56 Although inadvertent discovery is a characteristic of most
legitimate plain view seizures, it is not a necessary condition. 57 The
rationale for the plain view doctrine is sound in light of the well-defined
58
constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement.
In 1971 in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,5 9 the Court first enunciated that
police may, under certain circumstances, seize evidence in plain view
without a warrant. 60 The plain view doctrine supplements instances in
which justification for an intrusion already exists by permitting an officer to
secure incriminating evidence that he encounters. 6 1 If the initial intrusion is

55. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that "[i]t is well established
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant"); see also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (noting that "[i]t has
long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view" may be subject to seizure and introduced as evidence).
56. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468 ("[P]lain view
alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of [an item]."). An arrest or seizure
occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). A person can
be seized without being physically restrained where "in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). A
display of "official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave"' is evidence that a seizure has occurred. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Circumstances that
might indicate a seizure, even where an individual did not attempt to leave, include "the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer ... or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
57. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 130.
58. Coolidge,403 U.S. at 467; see supra Part I.A. l.a.
59. 403 U.S. at 433.
60. Id. at 456. The plurality opinion in Coolidge included analysis of the plain view
doctrine authored by Justice Potter Stewart, and joined by Justices William 0. Douglas,
William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall. Id. at 445. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 737 (1983) (plurality opinion), then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist authored a
plurality opinion which noted that Justice Stewart's discussion in Coolidge was "not a
binding precedent." In Horton, however, the Court acknowledged Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Brown but pronounced that "[t]he [Coolidge] decision nonetheless is a binding
precedent." Horton, 496 U.S. at 136.
61. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466; see Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)
(pronouncing that the plain view doctrine "authorizes seizure of... [an] item ... visible to a
police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and
who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity").
Accordingly, the plain view doctrine is perhaps better understood "not as an independent
'exception' to the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior
justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be." Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39
(plurality opinion).
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not justified by warrant or one of the established exceptions to the warrant
requirement, a plain view seizure is not authorized. 62 A straightforward
example of the applicability of the plain view doctrine occurs where the
police have a warrant to search an area for specified objects, and in the
course of the search inadvertently
encounter some other piece of evidence
63
of incriminating character.
The Court has noted that three conditions must be met for the plain view
doctrine to apply. 64 First, the officer must have lawfully arrived at the place
from which he viewed the object to be seized. 65 Second, the incriminating
' '66
character of the thing to be seized must be "immediately apparent.
'67
Third, the officer must have a "lawful right of access to the object itself."
62. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465.
63. Id.; see, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (finding a lawful search and
seizure of the defendant's clothing in a duffel bag where the defendant shared use of the
duffel bag with his cousin and the defendant's cousin consented to an officer's search of the
bag); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (holding a lawful search and seizure
where a robbery victim's automobile registration card was plainly visible and found by an
officer who was removing valuables from the defendant's impounded vehicle but did not
have a search warrant). Inadvertent discovery, however, does not have to be present in order
for a plain view seizure to be authorized. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. The
Court has recognized that the plain view doctrine has "an obvious application by analogy" to
cases where an officer "discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise
lawful search." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). The rationale and
practical considerations that accompany the plain view doctrine are no less salient with
regards to a "plain touch" or "plain feel" exception. See id at 375-76. Thus, "[i]f a police
officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or
mass makes its identity [as contraband] immediately apparent," the plain view doctrine
justifies the item's warrantless seizure. Id.
64. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136.
65. See id ("It is... essential... that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed."); see also
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that the fact that an individual has
taken steps to restrict some views of his activities does not "preclude an officer's
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the
activities clearly visible").
66. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136. The incriminating nature of an object is immediately
apparent if the police have probable cause to believe an object in plain view is contraband.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. Accordingly, if police must conduct some further research of an
object in plain view to determine if it is contraband, then the plain view doctrine cannot
justify the object's seizure. Id. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987), the Court
held that an officer's slight movement of stereo equipment in order to locate the item's serial
numbers to determine if it was stolen was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, despite the
fact that the officer was lawfully present within the apartment where the equipment was
located in plain view. "Contraband" is property in which the government holds a superior
interest, but only because the government elects to vest such an interest in itself. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n. 11(1967). Any interest that a party may have in possessing
contraband cannot be deemed "legitimate." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
Thus, government action "that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no
legitimate privacy interest."' Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123 (1984)). Although there may be "limits to what may be declared contraband,
the concept is hardly more than a form through which the [g]overnment seeks to prevent and
deter crime." Warden, 387 U.S. at 306 n.l 1.
67. Horton, 496 U.S. at 137. This requirement is "simply a corollary of the familiar
principle.., that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure
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An officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself so long as the item
68
seized is in actual plain view at the time it is discovered.
Although inadvertence has been a characteristic common to most
legitimate plain view seizures, it is not a necessary condition. 69 In Horton
v. California,the Court found that a police officer with a warrant to search
a residence for stolen property was pe;mitted to seize weapons found in
plain view while searching the dwelling, even though the weapons were not
discovered inadvertently. 70 The plain view doctrine, however, "may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
'71
something incriminating at last emerges."
The rationale for the plain view doctrine is sound in light of the two welldefined constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. 72 The
first protection, requiring a judge or magistrate to issue a warrant, is not
compromised because a seizure is only authorized where there is a prior
justification for the intrusion. 73 The second protection, that searches
considered necessary should be as limited as possible, is not jeopardized
because the plain view doctrine does not transform the initial search into a
general, exploratory one. 74 Furthermore, if contraband is in open view and
is observed by an officer from a lawful vantage point "there has been no
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy," and thus no Fourth
Amendment violation. 75 Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant under
absent 'exigent circumstances."' Id. at 137 n.7 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468); see
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66 n.10 (1992) (recognizing that if an officer's
presence in an area constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation, "no amount of probable cause
to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its
seizure").
68. See Michael J. Friedman, Comment, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The Problem of
Limited Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 313, 327
(1998).
69. Horton, 496 U.S. at 130. For an argument that the inadvertent discovery rule must
be restored in order to preserve the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and prohibition
against unreasonable seizures, see Robert Eyer, Comment, The Plain View Doctrine After
Horton v. California: Fourth Amendment Concerns and the Problem of Pretext,96 Dick. L.
Rev. 467 (1992).
70. Horton, 496 U.S. at 142. In Horton, the officer determined there was probable cause
to search the home of a suspected robber for weapons and the proceeds of the robbery. Id. at
130-31. The warrant issued to the officer authorized only a search for the proceeds. Id. at
130. At trial, the officer testified that while he was searching the suspect's home, he was
also "interested in finding other evidence connecting [the suspect] to the robbery." Id.at 13 1.
Thus, his discovery of the weapons, which included an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber
revolver, and two stun guns, was not inadvertent. Id.
71. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (plurality opinion). But see Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325-26
(acknowledging that the plain view doctrine may legitimize actions beyond the scope of
original exigencies that justified a warrantless search).
72. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467; see supra Part I.A.2.a.
73. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
74. Id.
75. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). Where a "search" compromises
the individual interest in privacy, a "seizure" deprives the individual of dominion over his or
her person or property. Horton, 496 U.S. at 133. In Texas v. Brown, the Court noted that
"[i]t is important to distinguish 'plain view,' as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an
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such circumstances is frequently impracticable and does little to promote
76
the objectives of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Subjective-Objective Test of Katz v. United States
In Katz v. United States,7 7 the Court established that an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the alleged wrongful
conduct invaded his legitimate expectations of privacy. 78 Katz marked a
departure from an earlier regime of Fourth Amendment doctrine by
clarifying that the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis is an inquiry
into whether a person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy." 7 9 To determine whether a person's expectations of
privacy are legitimate, the Court employs the two-part test enunciated by
Justice John M. Harlan in Katz ("the subjective-objective test"). 80 After

object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in plain view." Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4 (1983) (plurality opinion). Thus, if an article is already in "plain
view," neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Horton,
496 U.S. at 133. A seizure of an item in "plain view," however, "would obviously invade
Such conduct implicates the Fourth
the owner's possessory interest." Id. at 134.
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 n.4.
76. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987)
(noting that the "practical justification" for the plain view doctrine is "the desirability of
sparing police ... the inconvenience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the
evidence-of going to obtain a warrant"). But see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470-71 ("The
requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which
is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as 'per se
unreasonable' in the absence of 'exigent circumstances."').
77. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
78. Id. at 353; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (noting that Katz held that
the extent of Fourth Amendment protection depends "upon whether the person who claims
the protection.., has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place").
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss.
L.J. 51, 61 (2002) (noting that "Katz... signaled a shift, or readjustment, in Fourth
Amendment law"); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 904
(2004) (arguing that Katz effectively began a new regime of Fourth Amendment analysis).
Katz was "widely believed to be a watershed" decision. Michael Campbell, Defining a
FourthAmendment Search: A Critiqueof the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence,61
Wash. L. Rev. 191, 193 (1986); see David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz,
and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 145 (2002) (labeling Katz as "perhaps the most
influential search-and-seizure decision of the past half-century").
80. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. Commentators have referred to
Justice John M. Harlan's Katz test as the "subjective-objective test." See, e.g., Camille
Calman, Note, Spy vs. Spouse: Regulating Surveillance Software on Shared Marital
Computers, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2105 (2005). The test, an "assessment of the
subjective and objective expectations of privacy in terms of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment," is also known as the Katz inquiry and the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. Gregory Gomez, Comment, ThermalImaging and the FourthAmendment: The Role of
the Katz Test in the Aftermath of Kyllo v. United States, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 319, 325
(2002).
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Katz, the Court used the subjective-objective test "almost8 1exclusively" in
defining the extent of the Fourth Amendment's protections.
In Katz, the defendant was convicted for violating a federal statute by
transmitting betting information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami
and Boston. 82 The district court permitted the government to introduce
recordings of the defendant's telephone conversations as evidence, which
had been overheard by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who had
attached an electronic device to the public telephone booth that Katz used to
place his calls. 83 After the appellate court affirmed the conviction, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 84 The Court held that the government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the defendant's words
violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth, thus constituting a "search and seizure" under the
85
Fourth Amendment.
The Court's decision in Katz redefined the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection to extend to any activity in which an individual has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. 86 Katz
explained that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." 87 PreKatz Fourth Amendment doctrine was based on a property test that required
physical intrusion or confiscation of property in order to find a Fourth
Amendment violation. 88 The Katz opinion signaled the Court's shift away
81. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev 307, 328 (1998); see infra note 96 and accompanying

text.
82. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 348-49.
85. Id. at 353.
86. See id. at 351-52. The Court recognized that "reasonable expectations of privacy
may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion." Id. at 362 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also Campbell, supra note 79, at 191 (noting that the Katz Court expanded
the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
87. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan responded to this
declaration by asserting that the key question in Fourth Amendment analysis, however, is
"what protection [the Amendment] affords to those people." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan noted that
the answer to that question requires reference to a 'place' . . . . Thus a man's home
is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.
Id.
88. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation where federal agents placed a detectaphone on the wall of an office,
recorded conversations relating to a conspiracy, and submitted those recordings into
evidence); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that
wiretapping of defendant's residence did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure);
see Sklansky, supra note 79, at 152 (noting that the "trespass" test led the Court to find no
unreasonable search or seizure in Olmstead because the case involved "neither physical entry
into the suspect's house nor an actual confiscation of the suspect's property"); see also
Campbell, supra note 79, at 192 (noting that "prior to [Katz], the Court defined search by
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from the property test to a Fourth Amendment analysis grounded in a
person's reasonable expectations of privacy. 89 The Court asserted that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 90in his own
home[,] ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
The inquiry into whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy
is steered by the subjective-objective test enunciated by Justice Harlan in
Katz.9 1 First, the person must have exhibited an actual subjective
expectation of privacy. 92 Second, the expectation must be one that society

reference to the literal language of the [F]ourth [A]mendment"); Milton Hirsch & David
Oscar Markus, Should the Katz Test for Fourth Amendment Interest Be Abandoned?,
Champion, Nov. 2003, at 36 (noting that under the property test, no Fourth Amendment
violation exists absent a physical intrusion "onto the homestead, into the house, by laying
hands on the individual or on his private papers, or otherwise").
89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (acknowledging that "the 'trespass' doctrine ... can no longer
be regarded as controlling"); see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (recognizing
that "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited"); Maclin, supra note 79, at 55-56 (asserting that Katz "purported
to clean house on outmoded [F]ourth [A]mendment principles" (citation omitted)); Ric
Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprintfor Adapting the FourthAmendment to TwentyFirst Century Technologies, 53 Hastings L.J. 1303, 1303, 1307 (2002) (noting that the Katz

decision represented "a paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment law" in which the Court

"reversed nearly a century of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"); Swire, supra note 79, at
904 (observing that Katz "struck down the earlier regime of property rules" via its
declaration that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places (citation omitted)). But
see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and
the Casefor Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 809, 813 (2004) (noting that the property
approach to the Fourth Amendment has survived the development of the subjective-objective
test). For a discussion of the origin, development, and demise of the property test, see
Clancy, supra note 81. The Court cited multiple reasons for the need to shift away from the
property test. Simmons, supra, at 1303-04. As information became more valuable as a
commodity, the need to protect private speech and conversations became more prevalent.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. In addition, the location of a person's activity should not be
dispositive in determining whether that activity was entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For an argument that the primary reason
for the Court's shift away from the property test is that consideration of the method
employed by law enforcement agents in Fourth Amendment-related questions is no longer
relevant for determining whether a constitutional violation occurred, see Simmons, supra.
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Conversely, "what [a person] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 351-52.
91. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan formulated the two-part test in his
concurring opinion as part of his assertion that the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment
analysis is an inquiry into whether a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy" exists. Id. at 360. The Court has since adopted this test. E.g., Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (noting that Fourth Amendment analysis "embraces two
questions:" (1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy, and (2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable).
92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765, 771 (1983) (noting that "[t]he threshold question.., is whether an individual has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a previously lawfully searched
container"). But see Hirsch & Markus, supra note 88, at 38 (arguing that "Justice Harlan's
two-prong test tests for nothing at all").
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is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. 9 3 An individual's Fourth
Amendment rights are violated "only when the challenged conduct invaded
his legitimate expectation of privacy." 94 If a police inspection does not
infringe upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, the activity does not
constitute an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 95
The subjective-objective test has become the Court's principal
analytical tool for Fourth Amendment questions. 96 The Court has "created
93. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). "'[T]he test of legitimacy is not
whether the individual chooses to conceal [an] assertedly 'private' activity,' but instead
'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment."' California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986)
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)). In Ciraolo, the Court held
that officers' warrantless aerial observation from 1000 feet above the defendant's fenced-in
backyard within the curtilage of the home was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, where marijuana plants in the yard were visible to the naked eye. Id. at 213-14.
94. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis omitted). In Bond, the
Court held that an officer's physical manipulation of a defendant's carry-on bag on a bus
violated the Fourth Amendment. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39. The Court reasoned that
although the defendant expected his bag may be handled by another passenger or bus
employee, he did not expect his bag to be felt in an exploratory manner. Id. A traveler's
personal luggage is an "effect" protected by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
95. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 771. In Andreas, a customs search found that a shipping
container addressed to the defendant contained marijuana. Id. at 767. The Court held that a
warrantless reopening of the container following its re-seizure did not violate the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 771; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117
(1984) (confirming that "when an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that
occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information").
96. See Clancy, supra note 81, at 328 (noting that "[it was Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz that endured"); see also Hirsch & Markus, supra note 88, at 38 (noting that
the subjective-objective test "is for many lawyers and judges the principal legacy of the Katz
opinion"); cf Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (noting that "[t]he
touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security"'
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))). Reasonableness depends "'on a balance
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers."' Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975)); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (stating that the
"'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,"' which is measured objectively
by examining the totality of the circumstances (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250
(1991))). Although the Court primarily uses the subjective-objective test to determine
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, there are cases where the Court has not
administered the test in reaching its decisions. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-84 (relying
on the "open fields" doctrine to conclude that a search of open fields that led to the discovery
or seizure of marijuana was valid under the Fourth Amendment). Special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to people in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects"
does not extend to open fields. See id. at 176 (internal quotation omitted). The Court's
recent decision in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), has sparked considerable
debate amongst commentators regarding the future of the subjective-objective test with
respect to Fourth Amendment questions. See Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and
the PartialAscendance of Judge Scalia 's Fourth Amendment, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1013, 1022
(2001) (arguing that Kyllo "at least weakly endorsed" criticism of Katz and that "the Kyllo
majority did not apply the [subjective-objective] test to the case before it"); Sklansky, supra
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a hierarchy of privacy interests" 9 7 in using the test, including expectations
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, 98 diminished
expectations of privacy, 99 and expectations of privacy that society is not
prepared to recognize as legitimate. 100 Although both prongs of the test
"have raised difficulties," the Court places greater emphasis on the
objective prong.' 01
3. The Expectation of Privacy When Standing on the Threshold
Nine years after Justice Harlan first enunciated the subjectiveobjective test in Katz, the Court revisited critical issues concerning
expectations of privacy and Fourth Amendment protection in United States
v. Santana.102 In Santana, the Court established that the threshold of one's
dwelling is a public place.' 0 3 An individual in a public place is in an area
where he has no expectation of privacy. 10 4 Consequently, under Santana,
an individual standing on the threshold has no expectation of privacy and
fails the subjective-objective test. 105
note 79, at 147 (asserting that Kyllo "throws into doubt ... the reasoning of Katz... as it
usually has been understood"); infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
97. Clancy, supra note 81, at 331; see also Sklansky, supra note 79, at 155 (noting that,
post-Katz, the Court pursued a "sliding scale" approach to Fourth Amendment analysis). For
a detailed discussion of the Court's treatment of the different levels of the privacy interest
hierarchy, see Clancy, supra note 81, at 331-35.
98. The Court provides the strongest Fourth Amendment protection to expectations of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. See Clancy, supra note 81, at 331.
99. The Court has recognized situations where individuals have a diminished
expectation of privacy. Id. at 333-34. A reduced expectation of privacy is "more easily
invaded" when compared with the legitimate expectations of privacy which receive strong
Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 331; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that one's expectation of privacy in an automobile is
"significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's
residence").
100. Subjective expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as
legitimate receive no Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005) (holding that the possession of contraband invokes no legitimate privacy interest
protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also supra note 66.
101. Sklansky, supra note 79, at 157-58. The subjective element can be problematic
because, in theory, it "has the odd consequence that people who suspect the government are
spying on them may lose, for that very reason, much of their protection against what they
fear." Id. at 157. Critics of the second prong, that an expectation of privacy be one that
society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable, argue that its circular because an
"expectation of privacy is reasonable if the Court is willing to protect it." Id. at 158.
102. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, the Court found that police officers did not violate
the Fourth Amendment where they made a warrantless arrest of the defendant in her home,
after they attempted to arrest the defendant while she stood on the threshold of her home,
and then pursued the defendant into her home as she attempted to evade the officers. Id. at
42.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson, the Court held
that the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon probable cause did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 425 (finding the warrantless arrest of the defendant by
postal officers in a restaurant at midday was valid under a statute authorizing postal officers

2778

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

In Santana, police officers traveled to the defendant's home after
learning that she had been involved in a heroin transaction. 10 6 As the
officers approached the residence "[t]hey saw Santana standing in the
doorway of the house with a brown paper bag in her hand."' 1 7 The officers
were within fifteen feet of Santana when they got out of their van, shouted
"police," and displayed their identification. 108 As the officers approached,
Santana retreated into the house. 10 9 The officers pursued Santana through
the open door, "catching her in the vestibule."" l0
In deciding Santana,the Court identified the threshold as a public place,
as it "was not ... an area where [Santana] had any expectation of
privacy.""' Although under common-law property principles the threshold
of one's dwelling is "private," the line of cases interpreting the Fourth
Amendment confirms it is a "public place." 112 The Court reaffirmed that
"'[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.""'1 3 Santana's
position on the threshold rendered her "not merely visible to the public,"
but as "exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had
' 14
been standing completely outside her house."'
The Court ultimately upheld the defendant's arrest by finding it
appropriately within the scope of the "hot pursuit" exception. 115 By
retreating into her home, the defendant attempted to evade a valid arrest in a
to make warrantless arrests for felonies, provided they are performing duties related to the
inspection of postal matters and have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing a felony). While the Santana Court established that
the doorway is a public place, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's arrest by
concluding that the officers involved acted in hot pursuit. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43; see
infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Although the threshold itself is a public place,
the Court has recognized that it marks the clear boundary of the home's zone of privacy, and
cannot be crossed without a warrant absent exigent circumstances. See infra notes 142-44.
106. Santana, 427 U.S. at 39-41. In Santana, an undercover police officer gave marked
bills to Patricia McCafferty as part of a drug transaction. Id. at 39-40. After paying her, the
officer and McCafferty drove to Dominga Santana's residence, where McCafferty entered
the house with the marked bills and soon returned with several envelopes of heroin. Id. at 40.
After taking McCafferty to the police station, the officers returned to Santana's residence. Id.
107. Id. at 40. At trial an officer testified that Santana was standing directly on the
threshold. Id. at 40 n. 1 ("[O]ne step forward would have put her outside, one step backward
would have put her in the vestibule of her residence.").
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id.
110. Id. As the officers apprehended her, Santana tried to resist and the envelope in her
hand spilled "two bundles of glazed paper packets with a white powder" to the floor. Id.
(internal quotation omitted). The substance in the packets was later discovered to be heroin.
Id. at 41. One hundred thirty-five dollars was found on Santana's person, of which seventy
dollars consisted of marked bills. Id.
111. Id. at42.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
114. Id. Thus by seeking to arrest Santana, the officers "merely intended to perform a
function which [the Court] approved in Watson." Id.; see supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
115. See id. at 42-43; supra note 53; infra note 117.
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public place by finding sanctuary in a private place. 1 6 "[A] suspect may
not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is
therefore proper under United States v. Watson, by the expedient of
escaping to a private place." 117
B. The Heightened ConstitutionalProtectionAfforded to Individuals
Within the Home
Threshold cases such as Santana in no way undermine, and actually
reinforce, the line of authority emphasizing the sanctity of the home. The
law has long recognized that the home occupies a special place in the
spectrum of constitutional protection. 118 The importance of the right to
residential privacy is "at the core" of the Fourth Amendment. 119 In Payton
v. New York, the Court declared that warrantless searches and seizures
inside the home are presumptively unreasonable. 120 The Court has
identified the threshold of the home as a bright line for heightened Fourth
Amendment protection. 121 In recent years, the Court has used unambiguous
language in reaffirming the strong constitutional protection afforded to the
22

home. 1

116. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
117. Id.; see supra note 105. Once the defendant had been arrested, "the search, incident
to that arrest, which produced the drugs and money was clearly justified." Id. Santana
involved a true "hot pursuit" as "[o]nce [the defendant] saw the police, there was ... a
realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence." Id. at 42-43; see
also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (recognizing that police were permitted to
make a warrantless entry to arrest a suspect and search for weapons where the officers had
probable cause to believe that an armed robber had entered the house a few minutes earlier).
Although the police conduct in Warden fell under the exigent circumstances exception, its
conclusion verifies that one's act of "retreating into her house" could not "thwart an
otherwise proper arrest." See Santana,427 U.S. at 42.
118. See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *223 (noting that the law has "so
particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it his castle,
and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity").
119. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999).
120. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
121. See id. at 590; see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 636 (2002) (reaffirming that
the Fourth Amendment has drawn a clear line at the threshold of the house).
122. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004) (holding a residential search
conducted pursuant to a facially invalid warrant, which failed to describe the persons or
things to be seized, could not be regarded as reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes,
despite the fact that the items to be seized were described in the search warrant application
and the officers conducting the search exercised restraint in limiting the search's scope to
that indicated in the application); Kirk, 536 U.S. at 635-36 (finding that absent exigent
circumstances, officers' warrantless entry into a suspected cocaine dealer's apartment
violated the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding
that police engaged in an unlawful "search" when, without a warrant, they used a thermal
imaging device to scan the defendant's home in order to determine whether heat emanating
from the home was consistent with the use of high-intensity lamps employed in an indoor
marijuana-growing operation); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611 (finding a homeowner's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement officers brought media reporters
into the home to observe and record the attempted execution of an arrest warrant on the
homeowner's son).
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It was established as early as 1604 that the privacy of the home merited
substantial protection. 12 3 The precept that "'a man's house is his castle' is
"one of the oldest and most deeply rooted principles in Anglo-American
jurisprudence."' 124 The home's physical structure provides shelter and
physical safety, and its physical space is a source of privacy, comfort and
freedom. 125 The sacred and
special nature of the home was of critical
126
founders.
the
to
importance
123. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) ("It was firmly established long before
the adoption of the Bill of Rights that the fundamental liberty of the individual includes
protection against unannounced police entries."); see also Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610
(recognizing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment embodies [the] centuries-old principle of respect
for the privacy of the home"). In Wilson, the Court quoted Semayne 's Case, (1604) 77 Eng.
Rep. 194, 194-95 (K.B.), in discussing the widely accepted view that a man's home is his
castle. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609-10. The well-known passage from Semayne 's reads,
[T]he house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress, as well for his
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of a
man is a thing precious and favoured in law.., if thieves come to a man's ...
house to rob him, or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the thieves
in defence of himself and his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing ....
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 194-95. But see id.("In all cases when the King . . .is
party, the Sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him,
or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter."). This
language "established the Crown's power to enter a dwelling in criminal cases." Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 605 (White, J., dissenting). In Wilson, the Court held that a
homeowner's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement officers
brought media reporters into the home to observe and record the attempted execution of an
arrest warrant on the homeowner's son. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611.
124. Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man's Home Is His Castle? ": Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 Wm.&
Mary J. Women & L.175, 175 (2002). The precept "was enacted into the fundamental law
in the Fourth Amendment." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). The Court
has noted that this principle is "'jealously insisted upon."' Id.(quoting Francis Lieber, On
Civil Liberty and Self-Government 62 (2d ed. 1874)); see Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J.,dissenting) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
"gives the guarantee that a man's home is his castle beyond invasion either by inquisitive or
by officious people"); see also Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 42526 (7th ed. 1903) (noting that "[t]he maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,' is made a
part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen"). But see David Cole,
Scalia'sKind of Privacy, Nation, July 23-30, 2001, at 6, availableat 2001 WLNR 10081370
(arguing that the notion "a man's house [is] his castle" may effectively mean that "the streets
[will] belong to the police").
125. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev (forthcoming
Jan. 2006) (manuscript at 4 & n. 10), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-801245 (arguing
that the unique nature of the home justifies additional legal protection in some, but not all,
circumstances). "'A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some
shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place
which is a man's castle."' Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 n.4 (1961) (quoting
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
126. See, e.g., David H. Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England 45 (1967); Barros,
supra note 125 (manuscript at 8) ("[T]he 'historical record.., reveals that the Framers
focused their concerns and complaints [about government searches and seizures] rather
precisely on searches of houses under general warrants,' and reference to the importance of
home was common in Revolutionary-era rhetoric attacking excessive government searches."
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The sanctity of the home is afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection. 12 7 The unwarranted "physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed."' 128 The Court's decisions have consistently emphasized that the
(quoting Thomas Y. Davies, Rediscovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 547, 601 (1999))); Maclin, supra note 79, at 51-52 (noting that "[d]uring the Framers'
era, the home was the focal point of privacy and personal security"); supra note 123 and
accompanying text. But cf James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake:
Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L.J.
645, 668-77 (1985) (arguing that the Framers were principally concerned with a right to
privacy related to certain information within the home as opposed to a general right of
privacy in the home).
127. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). "'Freedom from
intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment."' Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places); supra note 87 and accompanying
text. The Fourth Amendment relates to the personal security of the citizen. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Court
has confirmed that a guest in a hotel room is also entitled to constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). But see
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (noting that "[t]he law does not prohibit
every entry, without a warrant, into a hotel room"); see also Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489 (noting
that "when a person engages a hotel room he undoubtedly gives 'implied or express
permission' to 'such persons as maids, janitors or repairmen' to enter his room 'in the
performance of their duties"' (quoting Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51)).
128. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). It is "axiomatic" that
defending the home from unjustified physical entry is the central aim of the Fourth
Amendment. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984); see Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (asserting that proceeding by search warrant "must be carefully
circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life"' (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
301 (1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was "intended to protect against invasions of
'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (confirming that "[w]ithout question, the
home is accorded the fIll range of Fourth Amendment protections"); Ker, 374 U.S. at 47
(noting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment did but embody a principle of English liberty, a
principle old, yet newly won, that finds another expression in the maxim 'every man's home
is his castle"' (quoting Osmond K. Fraenkel, ConcerningSearches and Seizures, 34 Harv. L.
Rev. 361, 365 (1921))); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (noting that if
officers were permitted to conduct a warrantless search of an individual's home, "the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it
affords largely nullified"). The recognized need for heightened legal protection of the home
is also evident in the principle that a person has no duty to retreat from an attack that occurs
in his own home. Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes, 790-91 (7th ed. 2001). In such cases, the "castle exception" permits a person
under attack to use deadly force to repel his attacker. Id.In People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496
(N.Y. 1914), then-Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo articulated the reasoning of the "castle
exception":
It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is
bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground and resist the attack.
He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own
home. More than 200 years ago it was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale: In case a
man "is assailed in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in other
cases... for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from flying, as that
would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by flight." Flight
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cardinal purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to defend the citizen from
unwarranted intrusions into his privacy. 129 An invasion of the sanctity of
the home is "'simply too substantial"' to allow without a warrant absent
30
exigent circumstances, even when probable cause is indisputable. 1
In Payton v. New York and its companion case, Riddick v. New York, the
Court reinforced the heightened protection the Constitution provides for
individuals within their homes, 13 1 and confirmed that "searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."' 132
In Payton, New York law enforcement officers
is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home. That there
is, in such a situation, no duty to retreat is... the settled law in the United States
as in England.
Id. at 497 (citation omitted). In Tomlins, the court held that a father being threatened by his
son in his home could kill the son rather than retreat. Id. at 497-98. For an in-depth study of
the retreat issue, see Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and
Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule, " Law &
Contemp. Probs., Winter 1992, at 303.
129. Jones, 357 U.S. at 498; see William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *139 (noting that
"[s]o great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community").
130. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423
(2d Cir. 1978)); supra note 32.
131. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (noting that the Payton decision
"strengthen[s] and protect[s] the right of the homeowner to privacy in his own home"); see
also United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
This Note refers to the opinion as the "Payton/Riddick" decision. See supra note 23. In
Payton/Riddick,the Court uses "strong language" in discussing Fourth Amendment rights in
the context of the home. Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757. Payton/Riddick was a "landmark ruling"
which clarified the strong constitutional protection provided against warrantless arrests in the
home. Linda Greenhouse, Court IncreasesArrest Restraints, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1984, at
B26. In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), the Court noted that the
"curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home, "warrants the
Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home." Under the common law, "the
curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Id.at 180 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
132. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. The Court noted that this standard is a "'basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law."' Id.(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78
(1971) (plurality opinion)). Both sides to the controversy appear to recognize a distinction
between searches and seizures that take place on a man's property-his home or office-and
those carried out elsewhere. It is accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless
the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on
the presence of "exigent circumstances." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 474-75; see also Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (noting that the "[b]elief, however well founded, that
an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of
that place without a warrant"). This basic rule "has never been questioned" by the Court.
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (quoting Stoner, 376 U.S. at 487 n.5). But see
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (noting that what a citizen is "assured by the
Fourth Amendment... is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he
consents; but that no such search will occur that is unreasonable"); see also Payton, 445 U.S.
at 603-04 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that a "rigid" rule that "absent exigent
circumstances officers may never enter a home ...to arrest for a dangerous felony unless
they have first obtained a warrant" is "founded on erroneous assumptions concerning the
intrusiveness of home arrest entries" and "finds little or no support in the common law or in
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possessed sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant Payton had
murdered a gas station manager. 133 Without obtaining a warrant, several
134
officers went to Payton's apartment in the Bronx intending to arrest him.
The officers found light and music emanating from the apartment, but there
was no response to their knock on Payton's door. 135 Ultimately, the
136
officers used crowbars to break open the door and enter the apartment.
In plain view, the officers saw a gun shell casing that was seized and
eventually admitted into evidence.137
Whereas Payton involved the plain view seizure of a tangible item,
Riddick v. New York involved the plain view seizure of a person. 138 In
Riddick, Riddick's young son opened their front door in response to the
knock of the police. 139 Through the open doorway, the police could see
140
Riddick sitting inside the apartment on a bed, covered by a sheet.
14 1
Without a warrant, the police entered the home and arrested Riddick.
In deciding Payton/Riddick, the Court communicated that for Fourth
142
Amendment purposes, a clear line is drawn at the entrance of a house.
The Court specifically referred to the doorway, noting that "[a]bsent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant. ' 143 Although the Fourth Amendment protects privacy in various
the text and history of the Fourth Amendment"); id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(calling attention to the "social implications" of the Payton/Riddick decision, which resulted
in the freedom of a convicted murderer and an armed robber).
133. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 576-77. The trial court held that the officers' entry was authorized under the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure and the evidence in plain view was properly seized.
Id. at 577. After the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed Payton, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed. Id at 577-78, 603.
138. Id. at 578. The Court notes that "the critical point is that any differences in the
intrusiveness of entries to search [as in Payton] and entries to arrest [as in Riddick] are
merely ones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental
characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual's home." Id. at 589.
139. Id. at 578.
140. Id.
141. Id. Although the door was voluntarily opened, it did not preclude the Court from
finding that Obie Riddick had suffered a Fourth Amendment violation, nor from employing
strong language in explaining in its ruling that the Constitution has drawn a "firm line"
marked by the threshold. See id. at 590; infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
142. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house.").
143. Id. "In Payton, the Court drew a bright line at the identifiable threshold of a
protected dwelling and said such a line cannot be crossed to arrest a suspect inside, absent
consent or exigent circumstances." United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.
1995). The Court has acknowledged the importance of the threshold by quoting statements
made by William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, in Parliament:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
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settings, "[i]n none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home."144
In recent opinions the Court has employed unambiguous language in
reaffirming the strong constitutional protection afforded to individuals
within the home. 145 In Groh v. Ramirez, the Court reinforced "'the basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that' searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."' 146 In Kirk v.
Louisiana, the Court reaffirmed that "'the Fourth Amendment has drawn a
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham,
Speech on the Excise Bill to British Parliament (1763)); see also Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204 (1981) (holding that absent exigent circumstances, a law enforcement officer
could not legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party).
144. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589. The Court has asserted that "the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion" is "[a]t the
very core" of the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961);
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (noting that an individual in an
industrial complex carries a diminished expectation of privacy because such a structure
"does not share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home"); United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 301-03 (1987) (finding that a barn is not within the curtilage of a "house" with
regards to Fourth Amendment protection); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985)
(finding that one possesses a "reduced" expectation of privacy in a mobile home); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that one's expectation of privacy
in an automobile is "significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and
freedom in one's residence"); Elizabeth Austin, A Man's Home Is His Castle, Legal Affairs,
July/Aug. 2005, at 14-15 (noting that as mobile homes are legally defined as chattel, they
receive significantly less protection from local, state, and federal laws relative to traditional
homes). But see Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (finding that "when [a]
home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of
transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were
carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street"). Additionally, the Court has noted that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares."
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,213 (1986).
145. See supra note 122; infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
146. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). The
Court also reaffirmed the principle that the "right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion" stands "[a]t the very core of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. (internal quotation omitted). "[T]he presumptive rule against
warrantless searches applies with equal force to searches whose only defect is a lack of
particularity in the warrant." Id.; see supra note 122. Four years after deciding
Payton/Riddick, the Court held that police are almost never justified in making a warrantless
entry into a private home to arrest someone for a minor offense. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 750 (1984) ("Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when
warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying
offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor."). In Welsh, the Court
held that a warrantless, nighttime entry into the defendant's home to arrest him for driving
under the influence of an intoxicant was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
754-55. In so holding, the Court rejected the state's argument that exigent circumstances
justified the officer's entry, because it was necessary to obtain evidence of the defendant's
blood-alcohol level before it dissipated. Id. at 754. The Court noted that "it is difficult to
conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor." Id. at 753. The Welsh
opinion "strengthened the constitutional protection against arrests without warrants in private
homes." Greenhouse, supra note 131.
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firm line at the entrance to the house,"' and "'[a]bsent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant."'' 14 7 In Kyllo v. United States, the Court declared that "[w]ith few
exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no." 14 8 In Wilson v.
Layne, the Court confirmed that "the importance of
the right of residential
149
privacy [is] at the core of the Fourth Amendment."'
The decision in Kyllo, in particular, is recognized as confirming that the
Court treats the home "as a special place for Fourth Amendment
purposes."' 150 In Kyllo, the Court held that police engaged in an unlawful
"search" when, without a warrant, they used a thermal imaging device to
scan the defendant's home in order to determine whether heat emanating
from the home was consistent with the use of high-intensity lamps
employed in an indoor marijuana-growing operation. 15 1 In discussing the
subjective-objective test of Katz, the Court noted that with regards to the
interior of homes, "the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that
is acknowledged to be reasonable"152 is well established and deeply rooted.
The Court emphasized the sanctity and constitutional protection of the
home in reasoning that any act which undermines the minimum expectation
of privacy in the home would "permit police technology to erode the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."' 53 Although the intrusion
in Kyllo was not physical, the Court announced that "any physical invasion
of the structure of the home, 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was too
54
much."1
This judicial practice of recognizing the sanctity of the home has led
several courts to conclude that a person retains strong constitutional
protection as he stands in the doorway of his home. 155 Accordingly, courts
adhering to the sanctity view find that where a person has opened his door
in response to a police officer's knock, the Fourth Amendment does not
156
permit the officer to seize an item in plain view at the threshold.
Conversely, other courts follow the voluntary exposure view and emphasize

147. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590); see
supra note 122.
148. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; see supra note 122.
149. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999); see supra note 123.
150. Sklansky, supra note 79, at 147; see also Maclin, supra note 79, at 117 (noting that
"Kyllo's emphasis on the home is understandable" given the "textual, historical and practical
reasons why the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has afforded the home special
protection").
151. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
152. Id. at 34. But see Seamon, supra note 96, at 1022 (arguing that "the Kyllo majority
did not apply the Katz [subjective-objective] test to the case before it"); Gomez, supra note
80, at 320-21 (arguing that the Kyllo Court did not actually conduct a proper subjectiveobjective test in its reasoning).
153. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
154. Id. at 37 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
155. See infra Part II.B.
156. See infra Part IB.
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the Santana decision in concluding that a person standing in a doorway
maintains no reasonable expectation of privacy and is susceptible to a plain
view seizure. 157 Part II discusses the competing approaches to plain view
threshold seizures and the manner in which supporters of each view
criticize the legal reasoning of the other.
II. THE CIRCUIT DISPUTE OVER PLAIN VIEW SEIZURES AT THE
THRESHOLD

This part describes the conflict between the different interpretations of
whether a person who opens his door in response to a police officer's knock
surrenders his privacy interest such to permit a plain view seizure at the
threshold. Part II.A explores the view that such seizures do not violate the
Fourth Amendment because when a person opens his door to public view,
he retains no expectations of privacy as to what may be seen from the other
side of the threshold (the voluntary exposure view). Part II.B examines the
position that such seizures violate the Fourth Amendment by infringing the
constitutional protection for the sanctity of the home (the "sanctity" view).
A. The Voluntary Exposure View
This section discusses the position that plain view seizures at the
threshold do not violate the Fourth Amendment because Fourth
Amendment protection extends only to a person's legitimate expectations of
privacy, the threshold is a public place, and an individual in a public place
possesses no legitimate expectations of privacy. Part II.A. 1 details the legal
reasoning that forms the groundwork for the voluntary exposure view. Part
I.A.2 considers the principal defects of the sanctity view, the competing
approach to this line of plain view seizures at the threshold.
1. Voluntary Exposure Defines the Extent of Fourth Amendment
Protection
This section explores the legal rationale of the voluntary exposure view.
Part II.A.l.a discusses how proponents of this view identify the Court's
decision in Santana as dispositive where plain view threshold seizures are
concerned. Part II.A.l.b describes the elements of a valid plain view
threshold seizure under the voluntary exposure view.

157. See infra Part II.A.
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a. Santana as ControllingPrecedent
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, 158 Fifth, 159 Ninth, 160 and
Tenth 16 1 Circuits have adopted the voluntary exposure view. These courts
have identified Santana as the controlling precedent for plain view
threshold seizures.1 62 Proponents of the voluntary exposure view apply a
straightforward syllogism to this line of seizures. The subjective-objective
test dictates that if a police activity does not infringe upon a legitimate
expectation of privacy, the activity does not constitute a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 163 Santana established that the threshold is a public
place and that an individual in his doorway is exposed to public view and
has no legitimate expectation of privacy. 164 Thus, so long as an individual

158. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that officers'
seizure of individuals in a suspected drug den did not offend the Fourth Amendment where a
suspect voluntarily opened the door to the dwelling).
159. See United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding no
unreasonable seizure where federal agents arrested a suspected drug dealer in the doorway of
his hotel room); United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
suspect in a counterfeit currency scheme had no protected expectation of privacy when he
answered his door as federal agents approached, and thus his warrantless arrest in the
doorway did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
160. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation where the defendant voluntarily exposed himself to a
warrantless arrest by freely opening the door of his motel room); see also United States v.
Botero, 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978). In Botero, officers that had not obtained a warrant
knocked on the defendant's door, and arrested the defendant when he opened it. Id. at 43132, Citing Santana, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the doorway
Botero was standing in was a public place. Id. at 432. Therefore, the court found Botero's
arrest proper under the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d
1000 (9th Cir. 1983). In Whitten, the court affirmed the warrantless arrest of defendant John
Gaiefsky in the doorway of a hotel room. Id. at 1015. The court cited Santanain noting that
"[a] doorway ... unlike the interior of a hotel room, is a public place." Id Gaiefsky was
suspected of operating illegal methamphetamine laboratories in Texas and California and
selling the drug in several states. Id. at 1005.
161. See McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a suspect's
arrest while he stood in the doorway of his residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
where the suspect had opened his door when the police knocked); see also United States v.
Herring, 582 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that a warrantless arrest made in the
entrance of a hotel room was valid because it was based on probable cause and occurred in a
public place).
162. The reasoning of Santana follows closely from the Katz decision, and Santana itself
quotes Katz. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). The Second Circuit cited
directly to Santana and Katz in its Gori opinion. See Gori, 230 F.3d at 51-52. The Fifth
Circuit relied on Santana in deciding Carrionand Mason. See Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128;
Mason, 661 F.2d at 47. The Ninth Circuit cited Santana in upholding plain view threshold
seizures in Vaneaton, Botero, and Whitten. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426; Whitten, 706 F.2d
at 1015; Botero, 589 F.2d at 432. The Tenth Circuit identified Santana as controlling
precedent in its McKinnon and Herring opinions. See McKinnon 103 F.3d at 935-36;
Herring, 582 F.2d at 543.
163. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
164. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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is freely opening his door,
he is voluntarily exposing himself to public view
16 5
and warrantless arrest.
The subjective-objective test governs Fourth Amendment analysis and
instructs that the Amendment's protection exists only in the presence of a
legitimate expectation of privacy. 16 6 No legitimate expectation of privacy
exists in anything exposed to the view of others.16 7 Thus, "' [w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. '"l 68 Once a house is opened to
public view through an open doorway, there is no expectation
of privacy as
69
to what could be seen from the other side of the threshold. 1
In light of the subjective-objective test, the Court's decision in Santana
dictates that an officer may seize an item in plain view where a person has
opened the door in response to an officer's beckoning. 170 A warrantless
arrest in a public place upon probable cause is not an unreasonable
seizure. 17 1 Santana established a "bright-line rule that a doorway is a
public place" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 172 Thus, an
165. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426 (noting that if the defendant freely opened the door of
his motel room to the police, then he "'voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest'
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537
(1982))); see also Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757 (finding the warrantless arrest of a defendant in
his doorway violated the Fourth Amendment because officers used subterfuge to get the
defendant to open his door).
166. Gori, 230 F.3d at 50 (noting that the "[t]hreshold question" was "whether the
defendants exhibited a legitimate expectation of privacy when they were ordered out of their
apartment") (citation and internal quotation omitted); see supra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text.
167. Gori, 230 F.3d at 50 (noting that "[n]o reasonable expectation of privacy inheres in
what is left 'visible to the naked eye' (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,450 (1989))).
168. Id.at 51 (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (emphasis
omitted)).
169. See id. at 53-54; McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that
a person standing in his doorway is "in a place sufficiently public that he [has] no legitimate
expectation of privacy"); United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that "[w]hen an individual voluntarily opens the door of his [dwelling] in
response to a simple knock, the individual is knowingly exposing to the public anything that
can be seen through that open door and thus is not afforded [F]ourth [A]mendment
protection").
170. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
"Santana controls" where officers lacking a warrant arrest an individual at the door of his
home). In Mason, Lois Ann Mitchell, the defendant's lover, attempted to purchase a ring
with a counterfeit bill. Id. at 46. Mitchell was detained and ultimately informed federal
agents that Mason had given her the bill and possessed more. Id. The agents, without a
warrant, went to Mason's house. Id.at 47. Mason came to the front door as the officers
approached the house, and was arrested at the doorway. Id. The court held that Mason's
warrantless arrest in the doorway was valid under Santana,Id
171. See Santana,427 U.S. at 42; supra note 105.
172. Honeycutt v. Gillespie, Nos. 97-35287, 97-35288, 97-35630, 1998 WL 391470, at
*1 (9th Cir. June 10, 1998); see Gori,230 F.3d at 52 (noting that "[w]hile it may be true that
under the common law of property the threshold of one's dwelling is 'private,'.. . it is
nonetheless clear that under the [Court's] cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment [the
threshold is] a 'public' place"). In Gillespie, the Ninth Circuit cited Santana and Vaneaton
to conclude that an officer's reach through the doorway to grab the defendant's wrist for the
purposes of arresting her did not violate the Fourth Amendment. GillesPie, 1998 WL
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individual in his doorway is in a public place and has no legitimate
expectation of privacy. 173 A seizure at the threshold therefore does not
legitimate expectation of privacy nor offend the
infringe upon a defendant's
74
Fourth Amendment. 1

Commentators' discussions of the principles behind Katz and Santana
substantiate the voluntary exposure view's use of those cases to justify its
position. It has been emphasized that Katz found that although the home
receives a special degree of constitutional protection, a person could not
"use the Fourth Amendment as a shield when [he or she exposes] activities
or objects to 'plain view."' 1 75 By focusing on one's expectations of
privacy, the Katz decision "undermined the theoretical basis for protecting
the house.., from invasions." 176 Because the Amendment protects people
rather than places, anything an individual exposes to the public is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 177 Thus, commentators argue
that a plain view seizure at the doorway does not violate the Fourth
Amendment so long as the arrest is accomplished before an officer crosses
the threshold. 178

391470, at *1. The court noted that because the officer "did not use force or a ruse to get
[the defendant] to open the door," the defendant voluntarily exposed herself to a valid
warrantless arrest. Id.
173. See Gori, 230 F.3d at 52 (reinforcing that a person in her open doorway is "'as
exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely
outside her house"' (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42)); see also United States v. Herring,
582 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting that "it cannot be said" that a defendant arrested
in the entrance to his motel room was arrested "in a private place"); supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
174. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
175. See Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The Loss of a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard,107 Dick. L. Rev.
179, 184 (2002). Although "'a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy . . . objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders
are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."' Id. at
192 n. 101 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
But see Campbell, supra note 79, at 198 (noting that "individual expectations of privacy are
not expectations that specific contexts will be private, but expectations that certain conduct
will not occur within those contexts").
176. Clancy, supra note 81, at 360. The Court's recognition that Fourth Amendment
protection extends beyond physical entry onto private property or confiscation of personal
property was "strikingly forward-looking." See Sklansky, supra note 79, at 153 (noting the
foresight of the Court's decision in Katz). But see Clancy, supra note 81, at 360 (noting that
"despite its lack of theoretical justification under Katz, the house has remained a core
protected place").
177. See Maclin, supra note 79, at 61. But see Sklansky, supra note 79, at 160 (noting
that although the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places, it "has simultaneously made clear" that the extent of the protection
generally requires reference to a place). Professor Tracey Maclin notes that Katz rests on
"simple, but persuasive logic." Maclin, supra note 79, at 71.
178. See Byran Murray, Note, After United States v. Vaneaton, Does Payton v. New York
Prevent Policefrom Making WarrantlessRoutine Arrests Inside the Home?, 26 Golden Gate
U.L. Rev. 135, 142 (1996); infra notes 197-200.
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b. The Elements of a Valid Threshold Seizure
Courts employing the voluntary exposure view identify multiple factors
as elements of valid threshold seizures. These courts devote more attention
to a person's reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of seizure than a
person's specific position in relation to the threshold. 179 In addition, an
exposure must be knowing and voluntary to be considered valid; an officer
cannot coerce an individual into appearing at the doorway. 180 Finally,
absent exigent circumstances, an officer must announce or conduct the
seizure before he physically enters the suspect's dwelling in order for it to
18 1
be upheld under the voluntary exposure view.
In deciding plain view threshold cases, the voluntary exposure view
places greater weight on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
than an individual's specific location with regards to the doorway at the
time of the seizure. 182 Determining whether a plain view seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment does not require placing emphasis on the
individual's exact location relative to the doorway. 183 It is not appropriate
to resolve a plain view seizure "on the basis of a suspect's placement within
a visible scene." 184 A person who voluntarily opens the door to his
dwelling "create[s] a vista from a public place or common area." 185 An
individual located in a place opened to public view cannot maintain any
legitimate expectation of privacy in that place and at that time. 186
Consequently, an individual standing at an open front door is located in a

179. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
182. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 52 (2d. Cir 2000) (asserting that "[t]he facts
critical to the analysis" are whether "the interior of [the residence] was exposed to public
view" and if the door was voluntarily opened).
183. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that these
cases are not just decided on where an individual was standing relative to the threshold, but
on "whether he 'voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest' by freely opening the
door of his [dwelling]" (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980),
aff'd 457 U.S. 537 (1982))).
184. Gori, 230 F.3d at 54. Although Santana established that the defendant was standing
directly in her doorway, the Court's discussion of her position was descriptive, and "not as
the formulation of a rule under the Fourth Amendment." Id.; see also Honeycutt v. Gillespie,
Nos. 97-35287, 97-35288, 97-35630, 1998 WL 391470, at *1 (9th Cir. June 10, 1998)
(noting that courts should "not engage in an individualized inquiry as to the amount of
privacy or exposure at the particular doorway at issue" because "[s]uch an inquiry would be
highly unworkable in practice").
185. Gori, 230 F.3d at 52; see Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (noting that when the defendant
saw officers approaching his hotel room through a window, "he voluntarily opened the door
and exposed both himself and the immediate area" to the officers). The Gori court asserted
that "a suspect exposed to public view through an open doorway, even at home, cannot claim
a protected privacy interest." Gori, 230 F.3d at 52.
186. Gori, 230 F.3d at 54. The Gori court asserts that in a dwelling, no one exposed to
public view possesses any expectation of privacy, regardless of "whether the [individual] is
on the threshold, in the vestibule or at the far end of an exposed interior room." Id.
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public place and subject 87to seizure "even if his feet were planted slightly
back of the door frame."1
For a person to forfeit Fourth Amendment protection of the privacy
interest in his home, he must knowingly and voluntarily expose the interior
of his home to public view. 188 If a person was led to open his door by an
officer's act of coercion or subterfuge, then he did not voluntarily place
himself in a public place and relinquish his expectation of privacy in the
home. 189 Any use of force or threats may constitute "coercion,", 90
including a demand for an individual to open his door under color of

187. United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987). Therefore an
officer is permitted to seize an individual that is standing behind the threshold rather than
directly on it. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425 (finding valid warrantless arrest where officers
stood outside the defendant's hotel room and arrested him while he was standing "at the
doorway but just inside the threshold."); supra note 56. In Vaneaton, the police had
probable cause to suspect the defendant of committing a series of thefts outside of Portland,
Oregon. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424. The defendant, a notorious burglar, had attracted
police attention by repeatedly selling goods to various pawn shops in the Portland area. Id.
The items sold included pieces of jewelry that had been stolen during recent unresolved
burglaries in the area. Id. The police began to search area motels for evidence and
discovered that Jack Palmer Vaneaton was staying as a guest at the first hotel they visited.
Id. at 1425. The police were surprised to find that Vaneaton was a guest at the hotel; they
believed he was already in police custody for a parole violation, and it was counterintuitive
that he would return to the scene of the crime. Id. Without a warrant, the officers
approached Vaneaton's room and knocked on the door. See id. When the officers
approached Vaneaton's room they were wearing uniforms and had their guns in their
holsters, and upon knocking, the officers did not make any verbal demands nor identify
themselves. Id. Vaneaton saw the officers through a window, opened the door, and was
arrested when he confirmed his identity to the police. Id. At the moment of arrest, Vaneaton
was "standing at the doorway but just inside the threshold." Id.The arresting officer was
standing immediately outside the threshold, and entered the room after informing Vaneaton
that he was under arrest. Id. The court relied on its own precedent and Santana in holding
that the defendant voluntarily exposed himself in a public place by opening the door;
consequently, his warrantless arrest did not offend the Fourth Amendment. See id at 1423,
1426-27.
188. Gori, 230 F.3d at 51; see also Gillespie, 1998 WL 391470, at *1. In Gillespie, the
Ninth Circuit asserted that if a person opened her front door in response to a knock, it is not
necessary to find that she actually knew that a police officer was standing behind the door in
order to conclude that she had voluntarily exposed herself to public view. Id. "Without
checking to see who was behind the door before opening it, [the defendant] voluntarily
exposed herself to whomever was standing behind the door." Id.; see also Vaneaton, 49 F.3d
at 1426 (concluding that the presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless seizure in the
home is overcome where a defendant voluntarily opened his door in response to an officer's
knock). But see United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1990) (declaring that
"[w]e do not expect others to walk in to our homes, even if the door is open, without first
requesting permission to enter").
189. In United States v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's warrantless
arrest as he stood at an open doorway within his home violated the Fourth Amendment
because the arresting officers misrepresented their identities in order to compel the defendant
to open the door. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 457
U.S. 537 (1982). In Vaneaton, the court remarked that "implicit in Johnson is approval of
the warrantless arrest of a suspect who voluntarily opens the door of his dwelling in response
to a noncoercive knock by the police." Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426.
190. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426.
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authority. 19 1 Courts have also found coercion to exist where officers have
92
brandished weapons at the doorway. 1
Courts have found subterfuge where officers misrepresent their identities
in order to compel an individual to open his door. 193 Yet in Gori, the
Second Circuit found that officers had not employed subterfuge in causing a
suspected drug dealer to open his apartment door where the officers
intercepted a woman delivering food to the apartment, stood behind her as
she knocked on the door, and ordered the suspects out of the apartment
once the door was open. 194 The court reasoned that "[a] person who opens
the door to a dwelling in response to a knock by an invitee opens to view
whatever can be seen by a nosy neighbor or an observant police officer,"
and thus individuals inside the dwelling retain no legitimate expectation of
privacy. 195 Similarly, in United States v. Carrion, the Fifth Circuit found
no subterfuge where officers traveled to a hotel to arrest a suspected drug
dealer and asked a housekeeping employee to knock on the suspect's door
96
and check whether the room was occupied. 1
Courts that adopt the voluntary exposure view also assert that, absent

exigent circumstances, an officer must announce or conduct the plain view
seizure before stepping across the threshold; thus the seizure precedes an

191. United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1997).
192. See Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757 (noting that a defendant's behavior was "hardly
voluntary in light of the coercive effect of the weapons brandished by... agents"); see also
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (finding an absence of coercion where uniformed officers did not
"draw weapons" and "used no force or threats" when they knocked on defendant's hotel
room door).
193. See Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757 (labeling agents' behavior as an act of "subterfuge"
where they identified themselves by fictitious names in order to persuade the defendant to
open the door to his dwelling); see also McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935-36 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding an absence of coercion and subterfuge where officers knocked on defendant's
door, properly identified themselves, and neither committed nor threatened violence);
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425, 1427 (finding that officers who knocked on the defendant's door
and "said nothing" did not "resort to a subterfuge or a ruse").
194. See Gori,230 F.3d at 47, 54. In Gori, two officers arrested Julio Gori outside a New
York City apartment building for selling cocaine. Id. at 46-47. Gori insisted that someone in
the apartment building had given him the cocaine, and the officers set up surveillance in the
building lobby. Id. at 47. Soon after a delivery woman entered the lobby, carrying an order
to the apartment identified as the drug den. Id. Although they had no warrant, the officers
followed the woman to the apartment door and waited until the occupants opened the door in
response to the woman's knock before ordering all of the occupants out into the hallway and
arresting them. Id. At trial, one officer testified that he followed the woman to the door for
two reasons: concern that (1) if he prevented the delivery, the apartment occupants "would
be alerted to the officers' presence," and (2) if the delivery was made, the delivery woman
might betray the officers' presence, "inadvertently or otherwise." Id. As the delivery woman
knocked on the door, "[b]oth officers had their guns drawn but at their sides and pointed to
the floor." Id.
195. Id. at 54. When the door was voluntarily opened, the apartment's occupants
forfeited the heightened constitutional protection that might flow from an actual expectation
of privacy in the dwelling. Id.
196. United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1987). "The employee
knocked, saying, 'Housekeeping,' and [the suspect] opened the door," leading to his
warrantless arrest. Id.
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officer's entry into the dwelling. 197 An arrest is "announced" or "effected"
once an officer informs a person that he is under arrest.198 Proponents of
the view acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the converse,
which would entail an officer making a warrantless entry into a dwelling
and then conducting a seizure inside the dwelling.1 99 Proponents thus argue
that so long0 as the seizure precedes entry, there is no Fourth Amendment
20
violation.
2. The Principal Flaws of the Sanctity View
This section reviews the means by which proponents of the voluntary
exposure view label the sanctity view as inconsistent with the Court's

197. See Murray, supra note 178, at 135-36 (noting that the Ninth Circuit would permit
an officer to make a warrantless entry into a dwelling provided he did not employ coercion
and that he "announce the arrest before stepping inside").
198. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425, 1427 (concluding that an arrest was effected where
an officer advised a suspect who had opened his front door that he was under arrest); see
also Carrion,809 F.2d at 1128 (finding that an arrest was effected where an officer drew his
weapon and ordered a suspect who had opened his front door to raise his hands).
199. See Anderson v. Long Beach City, 81 F. App'x 703 (9th Cir. 2003). In Anderson,
defendant Deborah Anderson opened her door in response to an officer's knock and
immediately backed away from her doorway and into her residence. See id. at 705. The
Ninth Circuit found an unreasonable seizure where the officers crossed the threshold and
walked several feet inside Anderson's home before placing her under arrest. Id. at 706. The
court reasoned that the officer's conduct violated the Court's decision in Kirk that a
warrantless arrest within one's home violated the Fourth Amendment absent exigent
circumstances. Id.; see also United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.3 (10th Cir.
2003) (concluding that defendant Willie Earl Flowers suffered a Fourth Amendment
violation where officers ordered him to open his door and then entered his house and
arrested him in his "living room area"); Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1276-77 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding an officer violated the Fourth Amendment where he stood outside of an open
side door to defendant Theodore E. Loria's house, and as Loria approached the door and
attempted to close it, the officer stuck out his arm to prevent the door from closing, pushed
the door back at Loria so that it struck him in the face, and then entering the foyer of Loria's
house); Honeycutt v. Gillespie, Nos. 97-35287, 97-35288, 97-35630, 1998 WL 391470, at
*1 (9th Cir. June 10, 1998) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where an officer
reached across the threshold to grab the defendant's wrist for purposes of effecting her
arrest). In United States v. Quaempts, the court concluded that a defendant living in a small
trailer home who had opened his front door while he was still lying in bed did not waive his
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy. 411 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). The court
reasoned that although the defendant had voluntarily opened his door, he remained in his
bed, which is "the sanctuary of the right to privacy." Id.
200. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (noting that officers who did not enter a suspect's
dwelling until they formally placed the suspect under arrest did not violate Payton); see also
United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1990). In Peters, the defendant
voluntarily opened his hotel room door in response to an officer's knock. Id. at 210.
Through the open door police were able to view crack cocaine, a razor blade, and a scale
inside the room. Id. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation where police
subsequently arrested the defendant and entered the apartment to seize the contraband. Id;
see also Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128 (noting that the Payton rule prohibiting warrantless entry
across the threshold is inapplicable where the "arrest was effected before the agents entered
[the defendant's] hotel room").
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precedent and thus fundamentally flawed. 20 1 The main critique of the
sanctity view is two-pronged: (1) The sanctity view misinterprets the
applicability of the Santana decision to the current controversy, 20 2 and (2)
the sanctity view misapplies the Payton/Riddick decision as controlling
precedent. 20 3 Part II.A.2.a explains how proponents of the sanctity view
misconstrue Santana in their Fourth Amendment analysis of threshold
seizures.
Part II.A.2.b clarifies why the sanctity view's use of
Payton/Riddickas controlling precedent is misguided.
a. Mistaken Interpretationof Santana
Proponents of the voluntary exposure view argue that the sanctity view
does not properly incorporate the Santana opinion into its analysis of
reasonable expectations of privacy. 204
The cornerstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is an inquiry into an individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy, 20 5 and in Santana the Court confirmed that the
threshold was a public place in which a person retained no legitimate
expectations of privacy. 20 6 The sanctity view, however, disregards the
holding of Santana as governing precedent by emphasizing that the Court
upheld Santana's arrest on the basis of exigent circumstances, 20 7 rather than
affirming the arrest because Santana was located in a "public place" when
officers initially approached her. 20 8 By focusing on exigent circumstances,
the sanctity view neglects the fact that the Court "ruled that the warrantless
arrest did not violate the heightened.., protections of Payton, because a
suspect exposed to public view through an open doorway, even at home,
cannot claim a protected privacy interest that triggers the warrant
requirement. ' 20 9 Accordingly, the sanctity view fails to appreciate that a
201. The entire circuit dispute regarding plain view seizures at the threshold is based on
tensions in a line of Supreme Court cases: Katz, Santana, and Payton. See supra Part I.
Although in theory each side of the split finds justification for its approach in the Court's
precedent, in practice each side is critical of the other for a flawed interpretation of the
relevant cases. See, e.g., Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) (criticizing

the voluntary exposure view as being wrongfully inconsistent with the Court's precedent).
202. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.

203. See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text.
204. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "the principle
that governs [the] facts [of plain view threshold seizures] is found in United States v.
Santana,not Payton").

205. Gori, 230 F.3d at 50.
206. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
207. See supranotes 115-17 and accompanying text.
208. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1429 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990). The
sanctity view also distinguishes Santana by the fact that the defendant in that case was
standing on her threshold and exposed to public view when the agents approached her house.
Id. In contrast, the cases at issue involve situations where defendants came to the doorway
in response to a knock on the door. Id.
209. Gori, 230 F.3d at 52. Consequently, the sanctity view bypasses analyzing these cases
through the Santana lens, which confirms that an individual who opens his door is exposed
to public view and has no reasonable expectation of privacy. See id.
at 52-53.
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person who opens his door in response to an officer's knock is in a public
place and thus surrenders his privacy interest such that an officer may
2 10
conduct a plain view seizure.
b. A Mistaken Application of Payton/Riddick
Rather than analyze threshold seizures through the appropriate voluntary
exposure lens of Santana, proponents of the voluntary exposure view
believe that the sanctity view wrongfully identifies Payton/Riddick as the
controlling authority.2 1 1 The Payton/Riddick rule is directed primarily at
warrantless physical intrusion into the home, which is not implicated by the
current controversy. 2 12 Moreover, the threshold seizure line of cases is
factually distinguishable from Payton/Riddick, solidifying that 2it13 is
inappropriate to designate Payton/Riddick as the controlling precedent.
Although the sanctity view regards Payton/Riddick as governing
precedent, Payton/Riddick was not designed to decide scenarios involving
an individual who voluntarily opens the door to his dwelling and exposes
himself to public view. 2 14 The purpose of Payton/Riddick was "'to protect
the physical integrity of the home."' 2 15 Knocking on a door to contact a
person inside is an everyday, "common event," and is "hardly a hallmark of
a police state." 2 16 Furthermore, the voluntary exposure view does not
compromise Payton/Riddick's declaration that the Fourth Amendment has

210. See id.
211. See, e.g., id at 51; see also United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1981)
(noting that under these circumstances, "Santana controls"). But see Murray, supra note 178,
at 135-36 (arguing that in deciding Vaneaton, "the Ninth Circuit ignored the firm line drawn
in Payton"); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) ("'The security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... is basic to a free society...
The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority
of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent
history to be condemned."' (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949))).
212. Gori, 230 F.3d at 52. Proponents of the voluntary exposure view assert that the
Payton/Riddick rule would govern the case where an officer makes an unwarranted physical
entry into a dwelling and then attempts to conduct a seizure. Id. at 51. However,
Payton/Riddick is inapplicable where an arrest is effected before an officer makes an
unwarranted physical entry into a dwelling. See United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120,
1128 (5th Cir. 1987); supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
213. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427.
214. In Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit noted that this type of scenario "does not materially
resemble the kinds of 'invasions' or 'intrusions' against which Payton seeks to guard." Id. at
1427; see also United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015-1017 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting
that the arrest of a person standing in his doorway did not violate Payton/Riddick because a
"doorway ... unlike the interior of a hotel room, is a public place").
215. Gori, 230 F.3d at 51 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990)). To
support its assertion, the Second Circuit quotes from Payton/Riddick: "'[P]hysical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."'
Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
216. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. But see id. at 1430 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (noting that
the voluntary exposure view will discourage citizens from answering their doors when police
knock from fear of liability).

2796

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

drawn a clear line at the threshold of a dwelling. 2 17 Payton/Riddick neither
holds nor suggests "that the home is a sanctuary from reasonable police
investigation. ' 2 18 Anything that a person "'knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own house or office,"' does not qualify for Fourth
2 19
Amendment protection.
On this view, Payton/Riddickcan also be factually distinguished from the
cases involved in the current circuit dispute.2 20 In both Payton and Riddick,
warrantless entries preceded the defendants' arrests. 22 1 In the cases at
issue, officers have announced or effected the seizure before physically
entering the home. 222 Payton/Riddick thus cannot be the controlling
precedent. 223 Proponents of the voluntary exposure view recognize that a
warrantless entry across the threshold followed by a seizure within the
home violates the Fourth Amendment. 224 So long as the seizure precedes
2 25
the entry, there is no Fourth Amendment violation.
B. The Sanctity View
This section explores the position that a person who opens his door in
response to a police officer's knock does not surrender his privacy interest
such that an officer may conduct a plain view seizure at the threshold. Part
II.B. 1 details the legal reasoning which forms the groundwork for the

217. Gori, 230 F.3d at 51. Courts that have adopted the voluntary exposure view
acknowledge that Payton/Riddick prevents an officer's warrantless entry into a person's
dwelling for the purposes of effecting a plain view seizure. See supra notes 197-200 and
accompanying text. These courts only recognize an officer's ability to make a warrantless
seizure at the doorway where the announcement of the seizure precedes entry across the
threshold. See supranote 200 and accompanying text.
218. Gori, 230 F.3d at 51. Rather, the Fourth Amendment merely protects the right to be
free from "unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961). In Gori, the Second Circuit quotes the Court in noting that "'[t]he Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than simply places."' Gori,
230 F.3d at 50 (quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)).
219. Gori, 230 F.3d at 51 (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)).
220. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426.
221. See id.(noting that "in both [Payton and Riddick], the entries preceded the arrests");
supra text accompanying notes 134-37, 139-41, 197-200.
222. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation where officers stood outside the threshold and arrested a
person standing inside the doorway); see also supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
223. See Gori, 230 F.3d at 52 ("[T]he principle that governs [these] facts is found in
United States v. Santana, not Payton."); McKinnon, 103 F.3d at 936 ("Payton contains
language that describes the Fourth Amendment as drawing a firm line at the entrance to
one's house, but, on its facts, it has no application to a doorway arrest made in [these]
circumstances ....
")
224. See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003) ("As
Payton and Kirk make plain, 'police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus
exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home."' (quoting Kirk v.
Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002)); see also supra note 199 and accompanying text.
225. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (finding that a warrantless doorway arrest did not
violate the Fourth Amendment in part because "[t]he police did not enter the house until they
formally placed [the defendant] under arrest").
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sanctity view. Part II.B.2 considers the principal defects of the voluntary
exposure view, the competing approach to this line of plain view seizures.
1. The Constitutional Protection for Individuals Within the Home Defines
the Extent of Fourth Amendment Protection
This section examines the legal rationale of the sanctity view. Part
II.B. L.a discusses how proponents of the view assert that the principles
behind the Payton/Riddick decision govern plain view threshold seizures.
Part II.B. L.b outlines the policy considerations that proponents cite in
advocating judicial adoption of the sanctity view.
a. Payton/Riddick as ControllingPrecedent
The Fourth, 226 Seventh, 227 and Eighth 228 Circuits have adopted the
sanctity view. 229 These courts find that the principles underpinning
Payton/Riddickpreclude officers from conducting plain view seizures at the
threshold. 230
The heightened constitutional protection provided for
individuals within the home is not surrendered simply by answering a
knock at the door.23 1 Nor does an individual forfeit all of his privacy rights
merely by placing himself in public view. 232 The Court has used
unambiguous language in confirming that the threshold of a dwelling
226. See United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a
person who responds to a knock maintains an expectation of privacy).
227. See Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that "a person does not surrender reasonable expectations of privacy in the
home by simply answering a knock at the door").
228. See Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1989) (asserting that an
individual who opened his door but remained in his dwelling would not be vulnerable to a
seizure).
229. Dissenting opinions in Gori and Vaneaton are also representative of the sanctity
view. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 57 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Proponents of the sanctity view assert
that a person who opens his door in response to a police officer's knock retains his privacy
interest such that an officer may not conduct a plain view seizure without a warrant.
230. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the sanctity view
adheres to the principles that underlie Payton/Riddick); see also Gori, 230 F.3d at 57-58
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that a plain view seizure at the threshold "trigger[s] the
heightened protection offered by Payton against warrantless entry into the home");
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (asserting that permitting a plain view
seizure at the threshold yields a result that is "flatly contrary to Payton v. New York").
231. See Sparing, 266 F.3d at 690. In Sparing, an officer had probable cause to arrest
Sparing but did not have a warrant. Id. at 687. After the officer knocked on defendant
Eugene Sparing's door, Sparing opened his front door but remained standing behind his
closed screen door as he identified himself. Id. The officer advised Sparing that he was
under arrest, and Sparing asked if the officer had a warrant. Id. The officer responded that
he did not have a warrant but did have probable cause. Id. When Sparing turned and walked
away from the screen door, the officer opened the screen door, took several steps inside the
residence, and ultimately completed the arrest. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the
officer's act of crossing the threshold was a clear violation of Payton and the heightened
constitutional protection for the home. Id. at 690.
232. Gori, 230 F.3d at 58 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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cannot be crossed absent exigent circumstances. 233 Furthermore, guarding
the sanctity of the home from threshold seizures defends the principle that,
234
absent exigent circumstances, any entry into the home requires a warrant.
It is well established that "there is no place where a person's expectation
of privacy is greater than in his own home." 235 This expectation of privacy
is sufficiently strong that a person does not abandon it by opening his door
to answer a knock. 23 6 Although consent is an exception to the warrant
requirement, answering a knock at the door is not commensurate with
agreeing to allow the person who knocked to enter. 237 Society recognizes
"a person's right to choose to close his door on and exclude people he does
not want within his home." 2 38 When a person opens his door, he has not
relinquished his right to close the door on an unwanted visitor and thus "has
not forfeited his privacy interest in the home." 2 39
233. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir. 1991).
234. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750.
235. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387; see also Gori, 230 F.3d at 58 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that 'the
importance of the right to residential privacy is at the core of the Fourth Amendment'
(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999))).
236. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387; see also Gori, 230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that an individual who voluntarily opens his door still possesses "an
expectation of privacy against government entry into [his] home and seizure[] of [his]
person[]"); United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a citizen inside his home does not forfeit expectation of privacy
"merely because that citizen opens the door in response to [an officer's] knock"). An
individual may "voluntarily expose oneself to arrest only by stepping outside of one's home
not by remaining within it." Id.at 1429.
237. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750 (noting that where an individual is in his dwelling and tells
someone else to "answer the door," he does not necessarily mean that he consents to let the
person at the door enter his dwelling); see also Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387 (noting that
"[a]nswering a knock at the door is not an invitation to come in the house"); United States v.
McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that, where an officer was knocking on
the defendant's door, the defendant did not consent to the officer's entry when he opened his
door halfway in an attempt to determine who was knocking); United States v. Shaibu, 920
F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that an individual does not expect another person to
walk into his home, even if the door is open, without first requesting permission to enter);
Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the defendant did not
consent to the officers' entry where the defendant had answered the door, refused a request
to come outside, and immediately stepped farther back into his house and attempted to close
the door).
238. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387. In Berkowitz, the court noted that the "right to exclude
is one of the most-if not the most-important components of a person's privacy
expectation in his home." Id. With a plain view threshold seizure, an officer has not even
given the defendant an opportunity to exercise the right to exclude. Id. The Court has
recognized that "[t]he right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
239. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387. In State v. Santiago, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
discussed an individual's expectations of privacy when he answers a knock at his door:
We answer our doorbells under a variety of circumstances, ranging from the
situation where we expect a visit by family or friends, to the unexpected and
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In addition, proponents of the sanctity view recognize that the Fourth
Amendment has drawn "'a firm line at the entrance to the house."' 240 That
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant unless exigent
circumstances are present. 24 1 The line has not been drawn "one or two feet
into the home;" rather, it resides directly at the home's entrance. 242 Any
unwanted attempted intrusion of the door-to-door solicitor. We open the door in a
variety of ways and to a variety of degrees, ranging from the opening wide in order
to welcome the visiting friend, to the wary and narrow opening in order to ward off
politely but firmly the unwelcome stranger. When we open the door, we may
stand just inside the threshold or may place ourselves squarely thereon. In all of
these situations, however, we do not abandon our right to close the door and
exclude the person at the door simply because we have opened it and are standing
there briefly. By opening the door in response to a ring or knock, and standing
there briefly so that our feet are on the threshold rather than just inside it, we do
not abandon our heightened expectation of privacy in our homes and place
ourselves in a public place.
619 A.2d 1132, 1141-42 (Conn. 1993).
240. Gori, 230 F.3d at 58 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)) (emphasis omitted); see United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423,
1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (Tashima, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[in Payton, the Court drew
a bright line at the physical entrance to the home").
241. See Duncan, 869 F.2d at 1102. Thus, entering a person's home without a warrant to
conduct a seizure, where no exigent circumstances exist, violates the clear command that the
Court made in Payton/Riddick. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1386-87. The Court implicitly held
that an officer can cross the threshold to effect a seizure when his entry into the home was
consensual. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428 n.1 (Tashima, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit
has set the standard for when an officer can cross the threshold to conduct a seizure as
acquiescence. Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2001).
Acquiescence exists where an individual recognizes and submits to the authority that the
officer asserts from outside the home. See Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387; see also Gori, 230
F.3d at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the Seventh Circuit position as
permitting an officer to cross the threshold where an individual has recognized and
submitted to that officer's authority). "Acquiescence" is a slightly less stringent standard
than "consent." See Sparing, 266 F.3d at 690.
242. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388. But see Sparing, 266 F.3d at 689-90 (noting that "[tihe
lines are not so clear" exactly where the "outside" ends and where the "entrance to the
home" begins). In Sparing, the Seventh Circuit asserted that where an individual voluntarily
stands "fractions of an inch" behind an open doorway, he stands in a "public place" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 690. The court stated that an individual standing
in that position is exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if he was standing
outside in a public place. Id. But that does not change the fact that for purposes of the
subjective-objective test, an individual standing just behind the threshold has not surrendered
the reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Id. In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the
dissenting opinions in Gori and Vaneaton do not regard any area in the home, including the
space slightly behind the threshold, as a "public place." See Gori, 230 F.3d at 61
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the heightened constitutional protection provided for
individuals within the home applies to anyone located within the boundaries of a dwelling);
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
protects an individual who is inside his home from being subject to a warrantless seizure).
In her dissent in Gori, Judge Sonia Sotomayor quoted a New Hampshire Supreme Court
decision that the Second Circuit had agreed with in deciding United States v. Crespo, 834
F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1987): "'[I]n the face of the [Payton] Court's holding that the
[F]ourth [A]mendment establishes a zone of privacy bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home, it becomes very difficult to contend that an individual
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violation of this "bright line" rule constitutes a Fourth Amendment
violation. 243 Thus, even where an individual has opened his door and
stands just behind the threshold, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that no
244
officer will invade the sanctity of his home by crossing the threshold.
Preventing plain view seizures at the threshold thus also protects the
principle that a warrant is required for entry into the home. 24 5 Voluntarily
exposing oneself to the view of a person standing outside the home does not
directly translate into making oneself "available to be physically touched or
otherwise seized. ' 246 plain view by itself is "never enough to justify [a]
warrantless seizure." 247 A plain view observation may help establish the
probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant 24 8 or permit an officer to seize
located entirely within that boundary... is in a public place."' Gori, 230 F.3d at 61
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1984)); see
also United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that "[a]
doorway ...unlike the interior of a hotel room, is a public place"). Crespo involved the
warrantless arrest of an individual that began at the open door to his home. See Crespo, 834
F.2d at 269. Although the individual's position relative to the threshold of his home was
unknown, the Second Circuit decided to apply the warrant and probable cause requirements
set forth in Payton/Riddick in reaching its holding. See id. at 270-71. The court ultimately
upheld the individual's arrest under exigent circumstances. See id.at 271.
243. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1430 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
244. See Gori,230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
245. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004). In Payton/Riddick, the Court
set forth warrant and probable cause requirements to protect the home against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Gori, 230 F.3d at 57 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 13032 and accompanying text. In Hadley, a police detective ordered officers to bring the
defendant in for questioning after receiving multiple reports that the defendant had had sex
with minors. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 748. When Sean Hadley saw the police approach the
house, he went to his bedroom and instructed his sister to answer the door and tell the police
that he was not home. Id. at 748-49. Hadley's sister opened the door and the police entered
the house. Id.at 749. Once inside the house, officers saw Hadley through the open door to
his bedroom, went inside, and arrested him. Id.The Seventh Circuit found that the officers
violated Hadley's Fourth Amendment rights under the Court's decision in Payton/Riddick.
Id.at 750. The court asserted that "when the front door swings open in response to the
knock of the police, the police [cannot], by virtue of the 'plain view' doctrine, seize anything
they see through the open doorway." Id In explaining its reasoning, the court explicitly
rejected the voluntary exposure view, and specifically mentioned decisions of the Second
and Ninth Circuits as representative of that view. Id.
246. See Gori, 230 F.3d at 58 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); see also Hadley, 368 F.3d at
750 (noting that the voluntary exposure view wrongfully "equate[s] knowledge (what the
officer obtains from the plain view) with a right to enter, and by doing so permit[s] the rule
of Payton to be evaded"). When the door to a dwelling is open, the occupants have no
expectation of privacy in what an individual standing outside the door may see, smell, or
hear from his position. Gori, 230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Such an expectation
of privacy (or lack thereof) is, however, "distinct and separate" from a person's reasonable
expectation that "no one would invade the sanctity of [his] home without a warrant or
warrant exception and probable cause." Id.
247. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971). In Katz, the Court noted
that what an individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
248. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750 ("If the officer knocks, sees something inside when the door
is opened, and then turns on his heel and uses the information he's just obtained to get a
warrant, no one's rights have been violated."); see also Gori 230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J.,
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an item pursuant to a valid warrant exception. 249 Such observation,
however, "does not dispose of the probable cause and warrant requirements
2 50
for the entry into the home."
Legal scholars'
discussions
of the
principles
underpinning
Payton/Riddick validate the sanctity view's use of the decision to justify its
treatment of plain view threshold seizures. Commentators identify the
home's status as a "sanctuary," and note that it has "retained [its] special
status despite the contentions that people, not places" receive Fourth
Amendment protection. 25 1
Personal security, freedom, and privacy
2 52
interests "are strongly reflected in the psychology of [the] home."
Accordingly, commentators assert that the sanctity of the home should
253
protect a person who answers his door when the police knock.
b. Policy Interests Related to the Sanctity View
In addition to the legal rationale of the sanctity view, proponents note
254
that public policy concerns warrant judicial adoption of the position.
Principally, preventing plain view threshold seizures protects the potency of
the warrant requirement. 2 55 Permitting a warrantless seizure at the doorway
would "undermine" the warrant requirement "for no good reason." 25 6 If an
officer goes to a person's house to make an arrest, and has reason to believe
that he may have to enter the home to carry out the arrest, he should obtain
a warrant. 257 Obtaining a warrant avoids potential problems that may arise
if a suspect refuses to open his door or if another individual opens the
suspect's door and the suspect refuses to come to the door. 258 In such
dissenting) (confirming that plain view observations "may permissibly form the basis for a
warrant authorizing officers to enter the home to seize evidence or arrest suspects").
249. Gori, 230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J.,dissenting); see infra notes 261-64 and
accompanying text.
250. Gori, 230 F.3d at 59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
251. See Clancy, supra note 81, at 345. Special legal protection for the home is justified
because of the "personal security, freedom and privacy" issues that are at stake. See Barros,
supra note 125 (manuscript at 4).
252. Barros, supra note 125 (manuscript at 4).
253. See, e.g., Murray, supranote 178, at 149.
254. See infra Part III.
255. See Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004); supra Part I.A. L.a.
256. See Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750. Undermining the warrant requirement is "inconsistent
with the spirit of Payton v. New York." Id.
257. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1388 (7th Cir. 1991). Where no exigent
circumstances exist, officers have "no reason... not to get a warrant, and plenty of reason to
obtain a warrant." Id.; see Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting that "[w]hen time permits, officers who elect not to obtain a warrant
unnecessarily risk the type of constitutional violation [that is] involved in [these] case[s]").
Id.If a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant can usually be obtained. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41(d)(3)(A); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981)
(recognizing that an officer can obtain a search warrant via telephone if necessary).
258. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388; see also Jack E. Call, The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Doorway Arrests, 19 Miss. C. L. Rev. 333, 340 (1999) (discussing some of the
potential problems faced by officers who go to a suspect's dwelling without a warrant
intending to make an arrest). Obtaining a warrant also saves time at trial and on appeal for
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cases, the police may be forced to return and obtain a warrant anyway, and
their initial attempt to arrest the suspect effectively warns the suspect of
looming liability. 2 59 By alerting the suspect of an impending arrest, the
officers risk the possibility that the suspect will attempt to destroy evidence
260
or flee the area.
Along these lines, the presence of the exigent circumstances doctrine
ensures that the sanctity view does not "hamstring" efficient law
enforcement or compromise public safety. 26 1 The law permits an officer to
consider any information he may gather from plain view 262 to determine if
exigent circumstances exist. 263 If an officer standing outside the threshold
sees contraband, evidence of a crime, or a suspected criminal, and
reasonably fears there is a risk that before he can obtain a warrant the
contraband or evidence will be destroyed or the suspect will flee, exigent
264
circumstances permit the officer to secure the evidence or the person.
Because the exigent circumstances exception remains available to officers,
maintaining the potency of the warrant requirement does not jeopardize law
2 65
enforcement efficiency or the public safety.
2. The Principal Defects of the Voluntary Exposure View
This section outlines the manner in which proponents of the sanctity view
characterize the voluntary exposure view as unsound in light of the Court's
precedent and relevant policy considerations. 266 Proponents of the sanctity
view argue that the voluntary exposure view incorrectly identifies the
controlling precedent. 267 Sanctity view followers believe that proponents of
the purposes of litigating the legality of seizures at the threshold. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at
1388.
259. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see supranote 53.
262. See supra Part I.A. 1.b.
263. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 59 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
264. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., United States v.
Cephas, 254 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding an officer's warrantless entry into the
defendant's apartment justified by exigent circumstances where the defendant voluntarily
opened his door in response to the officer's knock and the officer smelled marijuana and saw
a fourteen year-old girl inside).
265. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388. Although in theory it may appear that the exigent
circumstances doctrine could swallow the sanctity view, in practice that is not the case. The
doctrine does permit officers to use their discretion in shaping their conduct. See Hadley, 368
F.3d at 750. To allow atypical police activity, however, the circumstances must be
characteristic of an '"emergency or dangerous situation."' Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 742 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)). The current
controversy contains several examples of seizures that occurred under conditions that did not
require such immediacy. See, e.g., Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750 (holding the officers' doorway
arrest of a suspect invalid where the suspect was unarmed and posed no immediate flight
risk). In such cases, the exigent circumstances doctrine provides no shelter for offending
officers. See id.
266. See supranote 201.
267. See, e.g., Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750 (criticizing the voluntary exposure view as
inconsistent with the Court's precedent).
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the voluntary exposure view wrongfully classify Santana as controlling
269
precedent 268 by confusing dicta in the case with its actual holding.
Consequently, the voluntary exposure view's analysis under the subjectiveobjective test is incorrect. 270 Advocates of this view also wrongfully
manufacture a new exception to the warrant requirement. 27 1 Finally, the
voluntary exposure view adversely affects public policy because it makes
law enforcement more difficult and it erodes the privacy interests protected
2 72

by the Fourth Amendment.
The voluntary exposure view identifies the Court's decision in Santana
as controlling precedent for plain view seizures at the threshold, 273 but it
mistakes dicta in Santana for the case's actual holding. 274 In Santana, the
Court held that the officers' entry into Santana's home to complete her
warrantless arrest was justified under the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement. 2 75 Although the Court noted that a dwelling's
threshold is a "public place," 276 the Court "did not say that no warrant was
required because Santana's open door vitiated her expectation of privacy in
her home." 2 77 The voluntary exposure view incorrectly focuses on the
Court's discussion of the doorway as a public place and wrongfully
concludes that Santana is dispositive of a person's expectations of privacy
while answering a knock at his door. 27 8 Scholars assert that in terms of an

268. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
269. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 57 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
270. See Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387-88.
271. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
272. See id. at 1430.
273. See Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1386.
274. See Gori, 230 F.3d at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The voluntary exposure view's
"reading of Santana is not only incorrect but is irreconcilable with decades of Supreme
Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 57 (recognizing that the principles of Payton
"apply" to ."plain view" threshold seizures); Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting) (identifying Payton as the controlling precedent for plain view threshold
seizures).
275. The Court found that Santana's case was one of true "hot pursuit." See Gori, 230
F.3d at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388 (noting that "[m]oreover,
the entry in Santana was justified by hot pursuit"); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224,
229 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Court identified Santana as "involving a true 'hot
pursuit' and "went on to hold that the police were justified in pursuing [Santana] into the
vestibule of her home without a warrant because they had a realistic expectation that any
delay would result in the destruction of evidence"); supra notes 115-17 and accompanying
text.
276. See supra Part I.A.3.
277. Gori, 230 F.3d at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
278. See id. at 57 (majority opinion). This view "purports to base [an] endorsement of
police intrusion into the home on the Supreme Court's decision in ... Santana." Id.
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Because proponents of the sanctity view believe that the
voluntary exposure view incorrectly reads Santana, they find that the voluntary exposure
view thus neglects to appreciate that Payton/Riddick, not Santana, is the governing
precedent. See id at 57-58; see also Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the court declined to view Santana as controlling precedent to a
plain view threshold seizure).
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individual's reasonable expectations of privacy, "there is a significant
difference between a person who for no reason voluntarily decides to stand
in his open doorway, and a person who merely answers a knock on his
door."

2 79

The inaccurate conclusion of the voluntary exposure view followers that
an individual maintains no expectation of privacy when he answers a knock
at his door leads to a flawed Fourth Amendment analysis under the
subjective-objective test. 28 0 Proponents of the view thus erroneously
conclude that an individual at the threshold has forfeited the heightened
constitutional protection associated with the home and cannot suffer a
Fourth Amendment violation in the event of a seizure. 281 A proper inquiry
into reasonable expectations of privacy shows that an individual who
answers a knock at the door has not relinquished his expectation of privacy
in the home and still enjoys "an especially heightened Fourth Amendment
protection." 282 It follows that a plain view seizure at the threshold
28 3
constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation.
The voluntary exposure view also creates a new exception to the warrant
requirement. 284 In Payton/Riddick, the Court declared that a warrantless
seizure inside the home is presumptively unreasonable unless exigent
circumstances are present or there is a showing of consent to enter the
home. 285 The voluntary exposure view has concluded that a warrantless
seizure inside the home is reasonable, even where there is no showing of
exigent circumstances or consent. 2 86 The view thus "manufactures" a new
exception to the "firm line" established in Payton/Riddick,asserting that an
individual can "voluntarily expose[]" himself to arrest by answering a
279. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388. The person who voluntarily decides to stand in his
open doorway voluntarily relinquishes his expectation of privacy in his home by "exposing
himself 'to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if [he is] standing completely outside
[his] house."' See id. (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42). The person who answers a knock at
his door and stays within the house is not voluntarily exposing himself to the public as if he
is standing completely outside his house, and thus not voluntarily relinquishing his privacy
expectation in his home. See id.; McCraw, 920 F.2d at 229. In McCraw, the Fourth Circuit
noted that "Santana ...is distinguishable" from this line of cases because the defendants
involved in these cases were "not standing on the threshold of the doorway at the time the
[officers] arrived" at the dwelling. See id. Rather, the defendants involved in these cases
have come to the door in response to an officer's knocking. Id.; see also Sparing, 266 F.3d at
689-90 (noting the distinction between a case where an individual is voluntarily standing in a
open doorway, as in Santana, versus answering a knock at the door).
280. See Sparing, 266 F.3d at 690 (noting that "a person does not surrender reasonable
expectations of privacy in the home by simply answering a knock at the door").
281. See id.
at 690 n.3.
282. See id. at 689-90.
283. See id.
at 690.
284. See United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F,3d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
285. Id. at 1427-28.
286. See, e.g., id.at 1425-27 (majority opinion) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation
where officers announced a seizure while they stood outside the threshold and then crossed
the threshold to complete the arrest of the defendant, who was standing just inside the
threshold).
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knock at his door.2 87 The Court's decisions "do not support the existence of
creating such an
a 'voluntary exposure' exception." 288 Consequently,
28 9
exception is "flatly contrary" to the Court's precedent.
Moreover, the voluntary exposure view is "bad policy" because it makes
law enforcement more difficult and erodes the privacy interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 290 The approach discourages citizens from
answering knocks on the door by police officers, because it subjects them to
warrantless seizures inside their own homes in exchange for their showing
of common courtesy in responding to an officer's knock. 29 1 It also
"provides a justification for refusing to answer a police officer's knock. ' 292
As a result, the voluntary exposure view makes routine police investigation
more challenging and strains relations between police officers and private
293
citizens.
The approach also "erodes the privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment. '294 The Court has consistently reaffirmed that "[a]t the very
core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his
29 5
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'
The voluntary exposure view ignores the heightened constitutional
protection provided for individuals within the home 296297by permitting
warrantless seizures within the most sacred zone of privacy.
Each perspective on plain view threshold seizures thus finds
justification in judicial precedent and policy matters, and offers a
multifaceted criticism of the competing approach. While proponents of the
voluntary exposure view assert that a person on the threshold maintains no
287. Id. at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
288. Id. The Court's decision in Santana made the "sanctity of the firm line at the
doorway" quite evident. Id. at 1429. Santana's warrantless arrest inside her house was
upheld because of exigent circumstances. Id.; see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying
text. In addition, the Court has consistently reaffirmed its holding in Payton/Riddick that
warrantless seizures inside the home are presumptively unreasonable. See, e.g., New York v.
Payton/Riddick clearly established that exigent
Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1990).
circumstances and consent are the "only two ways" for the government to overcome the
presumption that warrantless seizures within the home are unreasonable. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d
at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
289. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
290. See id. at 1430.
291. Id. In Vaneaton, the majority noted that "[k]nocking on a door to attempt to contact
a person inside is a common event and hardly a hallmark of a police state." Id. at 1427
(majority opinion).
292. Id. at 1430 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
293. Id. The voluntary exposure view will also confuse officers rather than provide clear
guidance for how to determine whether a person has voluntarily exposed himself to a
warrantless seizure. Id. at 1430 n.9. Officers and courts will be faced with several issues,
including how far away from the doorway an individual must be in order to escape being
voluntarily exposed, and whether there are different rules for screen doors, glass doors, and
windows. Id.
294. Id. at 1430.
295. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citations omitted).
296. See Murray, supra note 178, at 135-36.
297. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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expectation of privacy and is vulnerable to seizure, 298 supporters of the
sanctity view conclude that the heightened constitutional protection
299
provided for individuals within the home renders such seizures invalid.
The next part discusses why policy considerations demand that courts
certify the sanctity view as the appropriate method for adjudicating
threshold seizure cases.
III. COMPELLING POLICY INTERESTS WARRANT JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF
THE SANCTITY VIEW

This Note advocates that future judicial treatment of warrantless seizures
at the threshold conform to the sanctity view. This part explains why a
person who opens his door in response to a police officer's knock should
not be susceptible to a plain view threshold seizure. 300 To the extent that
one of the approaches to plain view threshold seizures should be certified,
significant public policy concerns justify judicial adoption of the sanctity
view. 30 1 The competing approach undermines the warrant requirement by
providing a disincentive for officers to obtain warrants before attempting a
seizure. 30 2 It also adversely affects law enforcement efficiency, makes
police investigation more difficult, and strains relations between private
citizens and the police. 30 3 In addition, the voluntary exposure view fails to
offer clear guidance to officers on how to determine if an individual has
voluntarily exposed himself to a warrantless seizure. 30 4 Finally, the view
erodes the most important privacy interest protected by the Fourth
30 5
Amendment: the right to residential privacy.
The voluntary exposure view undermines a core principle of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by providing a disincentive for officers to satisfy

298. See supra Part II.A.
299. See supra Part ll.B.

300. By definition, widespread adoption of the sanctity view necessitates rejection of the
voluntary exposure view, which is used by, among other circuits, the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit is "the most overturned appeals court in the country." CNN.com Law Center,
Lawmakers
Blast
Pledge
Ruling,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/26/pledge.allegiance (last visited Feb. 16, 2006); see
also FOXNEWS.com, Flap After Court Rules Pledge of Allegiance Unconstitutional,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,56310,00.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (noting
that "[t]he 9th Circuit is the nation's most overturned appellate court"). But see
LaborLawTalk.com,
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/UnitedStatesCourtof Appeals for theNinthCircuit (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (asserting that the Ninth Circuit's reputation as the most
frequently reversed appellate court is "mostly a product of its high caseload" and that "[o]n a
percentage basis, the circuit is not overturned much more than any other"); see also
FOXNEWS.com, supra (acknowledging that part of the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate may be
attributed to the fact that it is the largest circuit in the nation).
301. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
302. See Call, supra note 258, at 340.
303. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
304. See id.
305. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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the warrant requirement. 30 6 If plain view seizures at the threshold are
reasonable, an officer may be more likely to bypass obtaining a warrant in
an effort to conduct a seizure. 30 7 So long as officers do not employ
coercion or deception, 30 8 a warrantless seizure will be permitted once a
person opens his door in response to the officer's knock. Decreasing an
officer's incentive to obtain a warrant dilutes one of the cardinal principles
law and is contrary to the spirit of the Court's
of Fourth Amendment
30 9
precedent.
The voluntary exposure view also compromises law enforcement
efficiency by making routine police investigation more difficult and
deterring productive relations between private citizens and officers. 3 10 The
approach will discourage citizens from answering knocks on the door by
police officers because it subjects them to the possibility of a warrantless
doorway seizure. 3 11 The view thus "protects only those who refuse to
answer their doors when the police knock. '3 12 It will jeopardize an
officer's ability to obtain useful information from private citizens, and
hinder his capacity to maintain healthy communication with members of the
community.
Additionally, the voluntary exposure view introduces uncertainty into
police work, rather than offering clear guidance to officers as to exactly
how to determine whether a person has voluntarily exposed himself to a
warrantless seizure.3 13 Officers, and ultimately courts, will be faced with a
host of questions: 3 14 Must a door be completely open to qualify as a
voluntary exposure, or does a half-opened door suffice? How far inside the
home and away from the doorway must a person be to escape being
exposed? Is a person exposed if he is standing at a partially open sliding
glass door? 3 15 In contrast, the sanctity view provides officers with clear
guidance, namely that a person's heightened expectation of privacy is
bounded "by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home."

3 16

Finally, the voluntary exposure view erodes the most sacred privacy
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 3 17 The Supreme Court has
noted that physical intrusion into the home "'is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."'' 3 18 It cannot be
306. See Call, supra note 258, at 340.
307. Id.
308. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
312. See Murray, supra note 178, at 149; supra note 292 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 293.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
317. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
318. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972)).
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disputed that the voluntary exposure view makes the home more vulnerable
to warrantless physical invasions. 3 19 The view compromises the privacy
interest in the home, and consequently imperils the core of the Fourth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The underlying principles that guide the competing approaches to plain
view threshold seizures have long played a critical role in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and, most of the time, can coexist peacefully
without discord. 320 Still, there is a clear tension between the sanctity view
and the voluntary exposure view; each view approaches the issue from a
fundamentally different angle and each view is well-founded in established
Supreme Court precedent and possesses strong justification-both in terms
of law and policy-for its position. By certifying one approach, the Court
will clarify judicial treatment of the issue, alert citizens to their liberties and
liabilities, and ensure that defendants at the trial and district court levels are
afforded the full breadth of their options in generating a defense.
This Note suggests that in light of the policy issues implicated by the
circuit dispute, the sanctity view's treatment of plain view threshold
seizures should receive widespread judicial adoption. The sanctity view
protects incentives for officers to comply with the warrant requirement,
promotes law enforcement efficiency, and defends the most sacred of
Fourth Amendment privacy interests, the sanctity of the home.

319. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
320. The facts of cases involving plain view threshold seizures tend to vary greatly, so a
court or commentator could parse the law and the facts of decisions from each side of the
split and reconcile disparate results.

